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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  BACKGROUND 
 
The participation of African countries in the Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) is insignificant.1 There are several reasons 
advanced for their inactiveness and one of the major stumbling blocks is the absence 
of stakeholder2 participation in trade dispute initiation within the individual country 
or regional arrangement. The lacuna caused, at national and regional level, by an 
absence of legislation or regulations setting out the procedural framework for 
stakeholders to participate in the initiation of trade disputes, where the activities of 
foreign firms and/or governments are causing or threaten to cause harm to their 
industries, is an obstacle to the protection of their trade interests. 
  
These procedural systems are absent amongst the stakeholders within the country, at 
national level and within regional trade arrangements like the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), to name but a few. 
The lack of stakeholder participation in these fora may be one of many factors 
contributing to Africa’s insignificant, if any, participation in the WTO DSS or 
Mechanism. 
 
                                                 
1 Chad P. Brown,” WTO dispute settlement and the missing developing cases:  Engaging the private 
sector”, Journal of International Economic Law, Volume 8 2005, 861. 
2i.e. all the firms, private or public and the industries within a country or regional arrangement that 
actively participate in its economy.  
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The process of initiating trade disputes through stakeholders is not novel. Such 
procedural mechanism exists in the United States of America (US) as stipulated by 
the Trade Act of 1974, in the European Union (EU) through the Trade Barriers 
Regulation of 1995 and an informal system in Australia. It is not surprising to see that 
the US and EU have been major participants as complainants in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism (DSM), when one ascribes their participation to the existence 
of procedural frameworks, ensuring active stakeholder participation in trade dispute 
initiation in these countries.3
 
The need for the development of a system to address the gap between the stakeholders 
and the state in the area of initiation of trade disputes is also being advanced by 
developing nations such as Brazil and Japan4. Recognising that some developing 
countries have participated in the initiation of disputes in the absence of such 
mechanism, the paper calls on other developing members and the least developed 
member states of the WTO to develop useful systems invoking stakeholder 
participation in the Dispute Settlement System at national level which should 
transcend into the Regional forae. 
 
Thus, this research seeks to find a suitable model/mechanism which meets the 
particular needs of developing countries. The practical aim of this research is to 
enhance active participation of various stakeholders in developing countries who may 
be adversely affected or who face potential damage by unfair trade practices of other 
players in the brutal and complex battleground of world trade. How can these 
countries use/or modify the rules of the game to apply in their domestic industries to 
                                                 
3 Jackson H.J “The World Trading System, law and Policy of International Economic Relations”, 
Second Edition, 1997 (MIT Press) Massachusetts p.107. 
4 http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2004/016.html accessed on 2 October 2006 
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maximize their benefits, or minimize costs of particular trade policies or actions of the 
other foreign players? In particular, how can Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries 
actively use the prevailing DDS system to maximize the welfare of their stakeholders? 
  
1.2.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The general objective of this research is to examine the importance and need for the 
establishment of a domestic system engaging the participation of stakeholders in the 
initiation of trade disputes at national and regional level in SSA which will enhance 
greater participation of SSA countries in the WTO DSS. 
 
The specific objectives of this Research are: 
 
(a) To investigate the lack of participation by SSA countries in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System. 
(b) To examine the importance of stakeholder participation in the initiation of 
trade disputes within a national and regional setting. 
(c) To critically analyze the trade dispute initiation mechanism in the United 
States of America, the European Union and Australia. 
(d) To make recommendations on the establishment of a workable dispute 
initiation system within Namibia and the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU). 
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1.3.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There is no legal framework allowing for active stakeholder participation in SSA 
countries (developing and least developed) and in the majority of developed countries 
at national and Regional Trade Agreements levels in the initiation of trade disputes.  
This research therefore seeks to suggest a suitable legal framework which can be 
utilized by stakeholders in African countries as part of the process of trade dispute 
initiation when their interests are threatened or adversely affected. 
  
1.4.  SIGNIFICANCE 
There is a call for the creation of a system to help private and public companies 
adversely affected by acts, policies, and practices of foreign companies and/or 
governments, which violate or deny rights or benefits under the WTO Agreements 
and other trade agreements or are unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory and 
burden or restrict commerce. Under such a system, injured companies would be able 
to petition their governments to initiate investigations that if successful, would lead to 
the settlement of disputes and remedy or lessoning of the resulting injury. The 
absence of domestic procedures in a country is a cause for concern over the stability 
of a country’s companies’ overseas strategies and implies a loss of bargaining power 
vis-à-vis foreign governments. Creating such procedures in a country will increase the 
transparency and fairness of the country’s administrative processes and is also 
essential for increasing opportunities for public participation in these processes. 
Moreover, in terms of foreign-affiliated companies engaged in business activities in 
another country, procedures aimed at insuring a level playing field would likely 
promote inbound direct investment, a longstanding top government policy of the 
majority of developing countries. Furthermore such an action, based predominantly 
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on WTO rules, would have corrective effects on the practices of foreign nations that 
are injurious to free trade, and in turn contribute to the stability of the world trading 
system.5  
 
 The importance of this mechanism was aptly stated by Brown (2005). He points out 
that in creating such a system the private sector typically undertakes the pre-litigation 
economic and legal research necessary to convince its government officials of the 
legal merits and economic benefits to pursuing a case. Then it engages its domestic 
government through access (or a threat of access) under the relevant domestic 
statutory provisions, such as the Section 301 policy in the United States and the 
Article 133 Process and the Trade Barrier Regulation (TBR) in the EU, whereby 
domestic industries can petition the competent government authorities to raise 
potential market access concerns. Conditional on the government’s willingness to 
pursue the case at the WTO, the private sector’ s attorneys and consultants are then 
likely to assist in the preparation of the formal briefs and economic evidence to be 
used in the litigation in Geneva. The private sector may also help induce foreign 
compliance with DSU rulings, either through identifying the most effective foreign 
political targets when retaliation is authorized by the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), or through the engagement of a public relations campaign 
abroad to increase the political willingness needed to induce removal of foreign 
market access restrictions.6
 
 
                                                 
5Chad P. Brown (2005) 871.  
6Id.  
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1.5.  RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
The investigative assumption, which the proposed research will examine, is that the 
establishment of a workable policy framework for the participation of private and 
public stakeholders within the domestic trade arena for the initiation of trade disputes 
by member states at the WTO (in their capacity as complainants, respondents or 
interested third parties) will increase the participation of developing countries in the 
WTO DSS.  Namibia, as a developing country and member of SACU, will be used as 
case study to demonstrate the applicability and need for a policy framework for use in 
a domestic and regional setting.  
 
1.6.  SCOPE 
The subject area is very extensive. To ensure that the objectives of this research are 
achieved, a limited but refined scope is proposed. The concept of stakeholder 
participation in the initiation of trade disputes will mostly deal with a comparative 
analysis between the United States Trade Act of 1974, the European Union Trade 
Barriers Regulation, and the informal system in Australia. The proposals in this 
research will be limited to the extent they are applicable to Namibia and SACU. 
Mention will be made of policies that may exist in some developing countries the 
world over. Otherwise the importance of Trade dispute initiation will be evaluated 
from the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) in which a shift from the 
traditional regime management to a Stakeholder model of participation in dispute 
settlement has been observed in recent years. 
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  1.7.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER 
OVERVIEW 
 
The available literature on trade dispute initiation at national level is scarce, but the 
available literature on the WTO DSS is exhaustive and contains literature on the 
subject matter. Most of the existing literature focuses on the US and Europe. A critical 
engagement of the various debates and Regulations/Act is proposed. The various 
approaches will be juxtaposed to examine their relevance and applicability in the 
context of Namibia and SACU. Questionnaires will be used to solicit information on 
the mechanisms available to stakeholders in Namibia and SACU as the literature on 
these mechanisms is not readily accessible.   
This paper contains five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction, Chapter two deals 
with the participation of African countries in the WTO DSS, and Chapter three 
discusses the stakeholder participation in Namibia and SACU. Chapter four gives a 
comparative study of stakeholder participation in the selected developed countries and 
limited information available on developing country participants, whilst Chapter five 
provides recommendations and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
WTO Dispute Settlement system 
 
2.1. Background 
 
Disputes in society are resolved in different ways. There are essentially two methods 
of peaceful resolution of international disputes. An international dispute can be 
resolved: through diplomatic negotiations between the disputing States (with varying 
degrees of third party intervention and assistance);7 or through adjudication by an 
independent entity (arbitration and judicial settlement).8 This paper undertakes a 
discussion of dispute settlement through adjudication under the WTO DSU and 
advocates that the participation of developing countries in this system is important 
and can only be enhanced through the creation of an effective mechanism that allows 
for the participation of stakeholders in the initiation of the trade dispute.    
 
In this paper, the participation of stakeholders in the initiation of WTO disputes 
should be understood to include their active participation when a WTO member 
initiates the complaint, or responds, or joins as a third party or files amicus curia 
briefs in a matter before the WTO DSB.9
                                                 
7 Article 2.3 of the United Nations Charter requires all members to: “settle their international disputes 
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered.” See Van den Bossche P. (2005) 175. 
8 Article 33.1 of Chapter VI, entitled ‘Pacific settlement of disputes’, of the UN Charter states, “The 
parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security, shall, first of all seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of 
their own choice”. See Van den Bossche P. (2005) Id. 
9Two reasons are advanced in support of the idea that participation in WTO Dispute Settlement matters 
for shaping WTO law and International Economic Relation. Firstly, participation in the WTO dispute 
settlement system is essential for shaping WTO law’s interpretation and application over time. WTO 
law cannot be amended or interpreted through the WTO political process as it requires consensus by 
the members to modify. This is one of the facts that further enhance the impact of WTO jurisprudence. 
Changes in WTO rules only take place through infrequent negotiating rounds, involving complex 
tradeoffs between over one hundred and fifty (http://www.wto.org accessed February 20, 2007. The 
membership total is as calculated up to January 11, 2007) countries with widely varying interests, 
values, levels of development and priorities. In addition, because of the complex bargaining process 
within the WTO, rules are often purposefully drafted in a vague manner as part of a political 
compromise. WTO members thereby delegate significant de facto power to the WTO dispute 
settlement system to interpret and effectively make WTO law. Secondly, WTO law, although it does 
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 The WTO dispute settlement is inter-governmental in nature and its prime object is 
the prompt settlement of disputes between WTO Members concerning their respective 
rights and obligations under the WTO law.10 The dispute settlement system forms the 
core of the WTO by acting as the central mechanism to enforce international trade 
law. It embodies a high level of legalization in comparison with other international 
institutions, and it confronts the most difficult political problems related to national 
demands for protection and international rules to manage a globalized economy. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the institution and distributional gains are said to be 
influenced by the participants in the enforcement mechanisms.11
 
The WTO DSS is a technical legal process consisting of four stages: filing a 
complaint, consultation, panel, and in some cases, appeal to the Appellate Body. The 
parties through mutual agreement amongst themselves can end this process at any 
stage before the panel renders its finding(s). 
  
Access to, or the use of the WTO DSS is limited to Members of the WTO.12 The 
Stakeholders (businesses, industries and private entities) directly affected by the WTO 
covered agreements have no standing to bring a claim before the WTO DSB, and can 
only have their voices heard through representation by their respective member state 
governments. 
                                                                                                                                            
not formally adopt a common law approach, has taken a common law orientation, with the Appellate 
Body and WTO panels citing and relying on past WTO jurisprudence in their legal reasoning. 
Individual WTO cases involve more than the judicial resolution of an individual dispute and the panel 
and Appellate Body decision produces systemic effects for future cases (Shaffer G.C. (2003) 9-10). 
10 Article 3.3 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding reads; “The prompt settlement of such disputes 
is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between 
the rights and obligations of Members”. Article 3.2 of the DSU further provides, “The dispute 
settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations 
of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”. 
11 Christina L. Davis and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, (2006), 2.  
12 US-Shrimp, The appellate Body in the US–Shrimp ruled that: 
“It may be well to stress that access to the dispute settlement process of the WTO is limited to 
Members of the WTO. This access is not available, under the WTO Agreement and the covered 
agreements as they currently exist, to individuals or international organizations, whether governmental 
or non-governmental. Only Members may become parties to a dispute of which a panel may be seized, 
and only Members “having a substantial interest in a matter before the panel” may become third parties 
in the proceedings before that panel. Thus, under the DSU, only Members who are parties to a dispute, 
or who have notified their interest in becoming third parties in such a dispute to the DSU, have a legal 
right to make submissions to, and have a legal right to have those submissions considered by the 
Panel.” 
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 2.2. Participation by Developing Countries in the WTO DSS  
The WTO DSS has been in existence for twelve years now. It has arguably been the 
most prolific of all international dispute settlement systems.13 Between 1 January 
1995 and 21 November 2006, a total of 360 disputes had been brought to the WTO 
system for resolution.14 This number exceeds the disputes brought before its 
predecessor, the GATT DSS. During this period many developing countries, and most 
comprehensively those in SSA remain bystanders. Developing countries in total make 
up two-thirds of the WTO membership, but they only initiate one third of the 
disputes15. 
 
Even though developing countries have been lagging behind in participation under the 
DSU, those developing nations who have participated have gained noticeable 
experience.  Participating as the complainant has been motivated by the consideration 
that a potential dispute may come along with such large trade consequences that high 
information costs will not prevent filing a WTO complaint because such costs will be 
low relative to the costs imposed by the trade barrier.16
  
Other countries may initiate their first case by joining a complaint that another state 
has already initiated. For example, China joined the WTO in 2001, and the following 
year initiated its first WTO dispute by joining eight other countries including the EU, 
Japan, and several developing nations against US-Steel Safeguards imports 
(WT/DS252).17
 
                                                 
13 Peter Van den Bossche, 173.  
14 http://www.eto.org, accessed March 29, 2007. Out of this total only in 75 did the parties agree to 
solutions or notify a withdrawal of the dispute. WTO Dispute Settlement Statistics( as of 21 November 
2006),Legal Affairs Division, WTO Secretariat. 
15 Some African countries such as Nigeria (WT/DS581), Senegal, Cameroon, Zimbabwe and Côte 
d’Ivoire (all four latter countries were third party participants in WT/DS58) have been involved as third 
parties. Moroco was the first country to file Amicus curiae brief in the EU Trade discrimination of 
Sardines case (WT/DS231). 
16This rationale for participation was the driving force behind Ecuador’s decision in February, 1996, to 
request consultations and file a complaint against the EU for losses from the EU banana regime. 
Ecuador is said to have rushed its accession to the WTO so that it could file its complaint in this matter 
(WT/DS27). As the largest exporter of Bananas, Ecuador’s losses from the EU banana regime 
estimated at $500,000 a day outweighed its potential legal costs from lodging the complaint. Christina 
L. Davis and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo (2006), 12-13. http://www.wto.org  accessed January 15, 2007.  
17 Ibid. 
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Experience as a defendant increases a country’s information about how the WTO 
process works. This experience can be utilized later for initiating a case. Indonesia, 
for example, had complaints filed against it by the EU (WT/DS54), US (WT/DS59) 
and Japan (WT/DS55 and WT/DS64) in a dispute about automobiles in 1996, and two 
years later initiated its first case against Argentina (WT/DS123) about safeguard 
measures on footwear. Compared to this, the South African experience as a defendant 
cannot be equated to that of Indonesia. South Africa was cited as a defendant in two 
cases namely WT/DS1688, concerning Anti-Dumping duties on certain 
Pharmaceutical products from India, and WT/DS288, concerning definite Anti-
Dumping measures on Blanketing from Turkey. In both cases the step taken so far has 
been a requests for consultation, and no request for the establishment of a panel or 
settlement notification has been made.18Thus the experience gained may or may not 
result in subsequent participation in WTO DSS or the level of progress made in the 
Dispute Settlement Process may influence the possibility of subsequent participation.  
 
Third party participation offers an easier window into the process. Countries can join 
as a third party under Article 4.11 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), as 
long as they demonstrate a “substantial trade interest” in the dispute, and they may 
join panel proceedings as a third party under Article 10.2 of the DSU if they 
demonstrate a “substantial interest” from either concerns with trade or systemic 
issues. As third parties they are able to present their own written and oral testimony to 
the panel, are able to see the submissions of the main parties and sit in on the full 
meeting of the panel.19 The case of United States-Safeguard on Circular Welded Pipe 
from Korea (WT/DS202) is a good example of a case where the participation of other 
WTO members as third parties may have brought about a different outcome or an 
outcome that would be beneficial to all affected WTO members. The matter related to 
a complaint by Korea against safeguards the USA applied against welded pipes from 
Korea on a quasi-MFN which measure affected multiple WTO member countries. 
                                                 
18 http://www.wto.org accessed May 12, 2007. 
19 Because the cost of participation in the WTO dispute settlement system is high, developing countries 
fail to defend their systemic interests within the judicial system in cases where they are not parties. 
Among the developing countries, only India, Brazil and Mexico had participated as third parties in 
more than eight WTO cases, whereas Japan had done so forty-two times, the EC  forty-one times, and 
the United States thirty two times, as of August 2002 (more recent statistics could not be found for the 
purpose of this paper). The majority of developing country WTO members have never participated. 
Where a developing country initiated a WTO case, a particular industry with high per capita stakes in 
international trade is typically behind the dispute and finances it. 
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Other exporting countries affected by the US measure, like the European Union and 
Japan, exercised their right to intervene as interested third parties in the dispute. But 
other adversely affected exporting countries, such as South Africa, Turkey and 
Venezuela did not formally participate in the dispute.20  In this case despite almost 
exhausting the WTO formal dispute resolution process, the dispute was not resolved 
by the US lifting the safeguards. Instead, a settlement was negotiated and this yielded 
a discriminatory increase in market access benefits to the Republic of Korea. A 
completely successful economic resolution to this dispute would involve the US 
eliminating all trade barriers, liberalizing imports of pipe from the Korean 
complainant, and extending that liberalization to exports of pipe from other source 
countries on an MFN basis. 
 
The above case scenario, more specifically the way in which the dispute was settled 
raises a policy concern of whether the lack of active participation by the other 
exporting interests contributed at least implicitly to a negotiated settlement, that failed 
to generate positive trade liberalization benefits for the other exporters (spillovers) 
and as stated by C.P. Brown (2005), instead led to a simple restructuring of the WTO- 
inconsistent policy into something that was likely even more discriminatory than the 
initial safeguard.21
  
                                                 
20 Some commentators allege that the decision not to participate may be seen as a move to “free ride 
and enjoy the market access benefits generated by the formal litigant’s efforts to liberalize the 
safeguard-protected market on an MFN basis”, but the writer adds that there may be other reasons for 
decision not to participate. C.P. Brown, (2005/1) 3. 
21 C.P. Brown, (2005/1) 3-4. Active participants develop a standard operating procedure, regular budget 
allocation, and organizational capacity for initiation of WTO disputes. Brazil, for example, has 
established a WTO dispute settlement division in its trade ministry, and encourages active private 
sector involvement in cases, and has created programs for training young attorneys in international 
trade law. It is argued that, although it will take time before other countries reach this level in their 
organization of internal resources, participation in dispute cases contributes to the process. According 
to Breckenridge21, Costa Rica’s victory in a dispute with the US over cotton underwear exports (DS24) 
concludes that “the country gained significant experience and expanded its capacity with regard to 
international trade and legal issues, while the legal team within the Ministry of Trade further enhanced 
its reputation for credibility within the Costa Rican Government. 
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 2.3. Hindrances negating participation by African developing 
countries in the WTO DSU   
 
There are five major challenges that developing countries face if they are to make use 
of the WTO DSS against resource-rich countries and their wealthy constituents:  
• lack of legal expertise in WTO law; 
• lack of financial resources, including for the hiring of outside counsel (high 
costs of access to the system); and 
• fear of political and economic pressure from the United States and EC that 
induces them to abandon justified legal claims,22  
• Developing countries’ relatively smaller value, volume and variety of 
exports.23  
• Lack of a mechanism for the participation of stakeholders in the initiation of 
WTO DS process 
The first four challenges will be briefly discussed below, while the fifth challenge is 
the core subject matter this paper advocates on. 
  
2.3.1. Lack of legal expertise in WTO law 
Greater legalization of international trade dispute settlement does not come without 
costs and the demands for human resources have sky rocketed if a WTO member 
wishes to invoke its international trading rights.24 The first problem that these 
countries face is in identifying and building a case as this requires domestic expertise 
both at an administrative level as well as in the affected domestic private enterprises 
on WTO covered agreements. The expertise concerns the assessment of the potential 
success in a dispute settlement proceeding (DSP). This requires in depth knowledge 
of the substance of the agreement and a functioning link between domestic industry 
and trade representatives in administration. 25Central to these requirements, is the 
                                                 
22 Davis, C.L, and Bermeo, S.B. (2006) 3-4. 
23 Shaffer G.C., (2003) 16. 
24 Shaffer Id. 7. 
25 Once a potential case is brought to the attention of a government, it must decide whether to file a 
complaint. Knowledge of the existing law and the elements of its potential claim are necessary to assist 
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need for trust in the WTO dispute settlement system. In essence it is the lack of 
knowledge about the DSS that hindrances participation of Developing countries in the 
system.26 The increased focus on legal dispute settlement has led to an increase in the 
need for legal capacity in the member state administrations.27
 
2.3.2. Lack of financial resources, including for hiring of outside 
counsel 
 
A bias in participation activity may stem from the current system of self-
representation requiring that countries have sufficient resources to both monitor and 
recognize relevant WTO violations and to fund legal proceedings in cases in which 
their rights have been violated.28
 
The cost of bringing an individual WTO case is extremely high and this further 
reduces developing countries’ incentive to participate.29 According to Brown P., the 
expected costs of formal participation in a dispute can be said to have two distinct 
components: the expected litigation costs and the expected political economy costs of 
confronting another nation in a formal dispute.30
 
 As a consequence, the demand on lawyer time, and thus the cost of specialized legal 
expertise, has skyrocketed. Litigation at the international level involves a distant 
forum in which legal expertise is U.S. and Euro-centric, highly specialized, and quite 
expensive For example, lawyers for Kodak and Fuji in the Japan-Photographic Film 
                                                                                                                                            
the government in calculating the likelihood of victory. There are also those issues that are only 
discovered/realized after the initiation of the dispute which may have tilted the scale in favour of not 
participating or initiating in a dispute. Information gathering is complicated and this hampers the 
judgment whether the expected outcome will justify the cost of initiating a case. Active participation of 
the government and stakeholders is necessary throughout the entire process from the selection of the 
case, initiation of the process and working with the legal advisor to complete the case. 
26 Christina L. Davis and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, (2006),  3. 
27 Martin Bjorklund, (2003), 7. 
28C.P. Brown, (2005/2).  
29Shaffer, (2003), 16. 
30 C.P. Brown, (2005/2). 
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case charged their clients fees in excess of $10 million dollar. Such fees are 
unthinkable for most developing countries.31. 
 
2.3.3. Fear of political and economic pressure from other WTO 
members that induces developing countries to abandon 
justified legal claims 
A recurring critique of the current DSU is that the WTO system is not fair because the 
final stage of implementation may depend on the relative economic power of the 
parties to the dispute.32 The associated problems faced by developing African in this 
respect are two fold, on the one hand they face other developing countries 
comparatively more developed and capable of exerting pressure,33 and on the flip side 
they face developed nations upon whom dependence for aid and other trade related 
support is essential for economic development of the SSA countries.34  
  
                                                 
31The alternative for a developing country to train internal lawyers with WTO expertise is typically 
worse than hiring outside counsel, since it entails significant long-term allocation of resources which is 
not cost-effective if a country is not an active player in the litigation system. The accuracy of this 
argument can be questioned as an investment in the training of a lawyer or expert in any field is 
regarded in all countries, as human capacity building. But, the reality of today is that, where developing 
country’s internal lawyers develop expertise and exhibit talent, they can be snatched up by private law 
firms that pay salaries against which developing countries cannot compete.  Thus start- up costs are 
high and potential economies of scale low. The spillover effects for developing countries, in contrast to 
developed country benefits, are almost purely negative, since, once a developing country trade official 
leaves to work for the private sector in the United States or Europe, that individual almost never returns 
to government service. The private market for lawyers thus further reduces developing countries 
incentive to dedicate resource to develop internal WTO expertise. Shaffer G.C., Id.17-18 
32 Id. 1. 
33The first problem arises from the fact that in the WTO all countries may declare that they are 
developing countries in order to benefit from some of the kinds of differential treatment afforded to 
developing countries. Some of the developing countries, like Brazil and India, are very powerful and 
pose possible threats to weaker developing countries. Börklund (2003) 3.  
34The second political pressure has the effect that, in the event that disputes do arise, the likelihood of 
their being brought before the DSU is hindered by the fact that although the WTO is touted as a system 
of equals, most African countries probably feel intimidated to challenge some of their developed 
trading partners. Most of Africa’s outside trade is tied to non-reciprocal trade arrangements such as the 
Africa Caribbean Pacific-European Union (ACP-EU) (this may be replaced by the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) being negotiated, but the result is the same) and African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA). These “favours” to African participants make the countries less likely to 
want to bring a challenge to the hand that feed them. Most African countries remain heavily dependent 
on donor funding and this further compromises their power in the WTO fora.  
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2.3.4. Developing countries’ relatively smaller value, volume and 
variety of exports 
The majority of developing countries are less active international traders, in other 
words, do not have a substantial economic stake in the litigation (no/minimal loss of 
market access) and, are thus less likely to be repeat players in WTO litigation. 
Because they are less likely to be repeat players, they have less incentive to deploy the 
necessary resources to develop sophisticated internal WTO legal expertise in order to 
participate in the first place. The developing countries also do not benefit from the 
economies of scale because of their infrequent use of the system.   
 
2.3.5. Lack of a mechanism for the participation of stakeholders in 
the initiation of WTO DS process 
The absence of a mechanism permitting interaction between private stakeholder to 
inform the government of measures taken that cause or may cause injury to industries 
in countries is a major obstacle for the participation of African countries in the DSS. 
A gap exists and the interests of the stakeholders as well as the government are not 
fully represented as WTO members. As will be illustrated in this paper, the 
mechanism will contribute to the lessoning of the impact challenges such as III(a) and 
(b), (and maybe (c )), have on the participation in the WTO DS by member countries 
irrespective of their development status.  
 
2.4.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Chapter sets out that a WTO member can participate in the DSU in various roles 
and like many judicial processes a dispute at the WTO has various stages. It has been 
shown that participation in the WTO DSU is dominated by its developed members as 
opposed to its developing members who make up the majority of its total 
membership. The benefits of participating in the DSU have been set out and it may be 
accepted that they outweigh the disadvantages. Five challenges are identified as 
obstacles in the way for participation in the DSU by developing WTO members and 
the impact of these obstacles are recognised. However the lack of stakeholder 
participation in the initiation of trade disputes is recognised as one of the main 
challenge. This paper will address it as it may contribute to the lessening of the impact 
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some of the other obstacles to participation may have on a developing countries 
decision to participate in the DSU. The next chapter sets out the mechanisms in place 
in Namibia and SACU for the participation of stakeholders in the initiation of trade 
disputes. 
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 Chapter Three 
STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN NAMIBIA AND 
SACU 
3.1. The integration of WTO law in the Namibian Legal system 
Namibia as an independent country has a constitution and domestic legislation (in the 
form of Acts of Parliament) and regulations which make up the corpus of its domestic 
laws. In order to put Namibia in perspective one needs to briefly discuss the place of 
international law (specifically the WTO covered agreements) in Namibian municipal 
law. 
 
Article 14435 of the Namibian Constitution provides that:- 
  “Unless otherwise provided by the constitution or Act of parliament, the general 
rules of public international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia 
under this Constitution shall form part of the Law of Namibia”. The effect of this 
Article is that treaties and international agreements to which Namibia becomes a party 
by ratification or accession will become part of municipal law. 36 .   
 
One can say that because of the effect of Article 144 of the Namibian constitution, the 
WTO agreements ratified by Namibia when it became a member of the WTO on 1 
January 1995, namely the Marrakech Agreement37, are self executing and these 
international laws do not need to be incorporated, for example through the passing of 
an Act of Parliament, in order to have internal effect.38  
                                                 
35 The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Act 1 of 1990. 
36 Gerhard Erasmus, (1989-90) 101. 
37 World Trade Agreement 1994 (establishing the WTO and including GATT Uruguay 1994, otherwise 
referred to as the Marrakech Agreement), concluded 15 April 1994 and entered into force on 1 January 
1995. 
38 Ian Brownlie, (2003) 48. 
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3.2. The current framework for stakeholder participation in 
Namibia 
The official webpage of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) states that 
“[R]ecognising the important role of the private sector in national development, the 
Ministry continues to co-operate with and provide assistance to private enterprise in 
Namibia. This is done by the formation of appropriate policies and strategies aimed at 
creating an environment conducive to the promotion of Namibia's products in external 
markets, the development of and assistance to small- and medium-scale industries, 
attracting and facilitating foreign investments in the country and providing attractive 
incentive packages to investors.”39
 
In realizing the aspiration quoted, the need for co-operation mechanism between the 
public and private sector in the trade arena received attention in July 2005. The MTI 
submitted a proposal to the Cabinet of Namibia requesting approval for the 
establishment of a formal consultative and cooperation mechanism (to be formally 
known as the National Trade Forum (NTF)) between MTI and what is referred to as 
“the economic stakeholders, especially the private business sector.” The rationale 
behind the establishment of the mechanism is said to be “necessary for a joint effort 
towards the realization of national aspiration and objectives and the positioning of 
Namibia competitively in international trade and investment arenas.” The mechanism 
was approved by Cabinet40 and the NTF was launched on October 31, 2005. The NTF 
was registered as an organization not for gain on 6 June 2006.41 According to the 
available information the forum is not yet operational and is in the process of setting 
up its Secretariat.42
 
In addition to the establishment of the NTF, the Government entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding with lobby groups representing the respective 
                                                 
39 http://www.mti.gov.na , visited 23 April 2007. 
40 Cabinet Decision No. 17, August, 2, 2007. The operational rules and procedures are contained in the 
proposed terms of reference of the National Trade Forum (NFT) and the NFT Operational Rules and 
Procedures.    
41 The Forum is rregistered under registration number 21/2006/232 in terms of Section 21 of the 
Companies Act of 1973, as amended. 
42 The information has been provided by a reliable source from the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
through a response to a questionnaire. The participant has requested not to be named for the purposes 
of this paper.  
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industries. The lobby groups are the Namibian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
Namibia Manufacturers Association and Indigenous Business Council. According to 
the Operational Rules and Procedures (ORP), the government undertook to consult 
with the lobby groups and any request for financial or technical support is to be 
requested through the NTF. 
 
The rational behind the establishment of the NTF as set out above, is for the 
realization of national aspiration and objectives and the positioning of Namibia 
competitively in international trade and investment. International trade can be any 
trade between nations and the provision does not specifically refer to the international 
trade under the WTO, and this forum may actually be established to serve the interest 
of all international trade activities Namibia engages in. The NTF’s responsibilities 
may include Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), the EPAs being negotiated with Europe, 
Bilateral Trade Agreements (BITs) and the trade between Namibia and Europe as a 
consequence of the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) entered 
into between South Africa and the latter, to name a few. The fact that the forum’s 
ORP are silent on the initiation or participation by Namibia in international dispute, 
let alone the WTO DSU, is an indication that the country has not put in place the 
measures necessary to address its participation with the assistance of its stakeholders 
in the WTO DSU.  
A reading of the ORP indicates that they deal with the day to day functioning of NTF, 
detail on the various meetings that have to take place is set out but what the essence 
and aim of these numerous meetings will be is not clear, maybe the subject matters for 
discussion are selected according to the particular matter considered as important at 
the time preceding it or as decided at the last meeting held. The perception is that the 
Forum is not functioning very well.43
 
 According to the MTI, four sub-committees were established to compliment and 
strengthen the functionality of the NTF, namely; trade in service, agricultural trade, 
non agricultural market access and fisheries and aquaculture. Like the Operational 
Rules and Procedures, these sub-committees function through continuous meetings 
that are held on a monthly basis.  
                                                 
43 The participants in the interviews conducted have requested that they remain anonymous.  
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 A reading of Provision 2.3 of the OPR is mind boggling as in addition to the 
requirement of participation by member in the various meetings of the NTF, it further  
states that such participation implies and demands a high degree of confidentiality and 
participants may be required to sign restrictive confidentiality agreements with the 
NTF. One hopes that the confidentiality requirement will only be raised in matters 
where it is directed towards protecting trade secrets of an industry or where it may be 
in the public interest, or some other justifiable reason to do so. One hopes that this 
provision and provision 7.2, discussed below, will not be used to veto the initiation of 
potential trade dispute(s) by the government, motivated by a blatant exercise of its 
power to the detriment of an affected industry.   
 
In addition to the NTF, there is an Agricultural Trade Forum with similar terms of 
reference which is said to be more effective than the NTF, however there is no formal 
mechanism to bring WTO violations to the attention of the government. The 
manufacturing sector has a Manufacturing Association and the Meat Board of 
Namibia, both of which are proactive in the protection of the interests of the 
stakeholders within these industries. 
 
The two industries in Namibia that have been exposed to measures taken by other 
WTO members which have caused adverse effects to the detriment of the domestic 
industries and where the government could but did not initiate WTO dispute in terms 
of the DSU are the Dairy and Beef industry. A brief discussion of the events that took 
place and upon which this paper relies in claiming that WTO dispute initiation ought 
to have been engaged in will follow. 
  
The Dairy industry has been under constant pressure from dairy imports from South 
Africa since 2005 and this resulted in the closure of one of its dairy producers, 
Rietfontein factory in February, 2005. During this period milk prices in South 
Africa44 had dropped unexpectedly and the Namibian industry faced an influx of 
cheap dairy products from its southern neighbours. Once again on August 21, 2006, 
                                                 
44 The dairy volumes in Namibia are said to represent about 1% of the South African dairy market and 
this makes the industry highly vulnerable to market diversion from South Africa. The problem is 
further aggravated by the absence of a mechanism in place to address the influx of subsidized dairy 
imports into Namibia. http://www.dairyafrica.com accessed March 28, 2007. 
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the Namibia Agricultural Union issued an urgent press release calling for government 
intervention to protect the dairy industry, which was facing a possible closure, as well 
as the infant UHT milk industry, the protection of which is expected to come to and 
end in 2007.45 Independent consultants46 were approached and their investigations 
revealed that unfair trade practices severely damaging to the industry were taking 
place. These practices are said to have resulted in job losses, price cuts to produce and 
factory closures.47
 
Beef is one of the most important products in Namibia and the industry has also been 
exposed to various trade distorting measures.48 The EU provides direct support per 
year to its farmers in addition; there is indirect support of tariffs that make imports 
artificially expensive, as well as national level assistance to farmers.49  
                                                 
45http://www.dairyafrica.com/news accessed March 28, 2007.  
46 Namibia, like all most other developing countries, has a shortage/total lack of persons with the 
necessary academic qualifications to opine on trade related issues. This was once again confirmed in 
the dairy matter as the government obtained legal opinion on the matter from Trade Law Centre for 
Southern Africa (TRALAC). 
47 The industry’s concerns were addressed and there are indications that the extension of the Infant 
Industry Protection until 2012 will be gazetted soon, enforcing a 40-percent levy on all imported UHT 
milk. The industry applied for an extension to SACU through the Ministry of Trade to bring some 
relief to the dairy industry, which is going through turbulent times due to more competitively priced 
milk from neighbouring South Africa. A price increase of 50-cents per litre took effect from 1 April 
2007 removing fears of a possible collapse of the industry and dependence on imports which could lead 
to increases in retail prices due to the lack of competition resulting from such industry collapse. 
http://www.dairyafrica.com/news.asp?ID=29, New Era, March 28, 2007, Could SA’s Milk Shortage 
Hit Namibia? accessed May 11, 2007.   
48 Namibia exports beef to Europe and the preferences it receives from Europe include specific duties 
and applied tariff quotas. One consequences of this is that imports from Namibia are only of higher 
quality beef, and this tends to result in export quality being higher than average domestic quality. 
Consequently only producers with higher quality beef benefit from this.  The chances of poorer 
producers participating in the lucrative trade are reduced, because they lack the ability to finance 
quality production (unless the government makes appropriate provision). The disparity is further 
widened when specific duty combined with a tariff quota encourages exports to be of only the highest 
quality. 
49 Stevens C., Food Trade and Food Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Old Myths and New Challenges, 
Development Policy Review, 21/2003, 669-681, at 674. Stevens comments that Africa’s greatest gains 
from exporting to Europe have been in the products that appear at first glance to be the most heavily 
protected and to receive the least generous preferences.  Beef is a traditional export to the European 
Union markets that is heavily influenced by Agricultural protectionism. Europe applies the concept of 
trade policy rent, which briefly stated exists when a market is distorted but certain supplies receive 
preferential access. The purpose of the distortion is to enable domestic European producers to sell 
goods that consumers would otherwise prefer to buy from foreign producers (whether the because they 
are cheaper or preferred quality or whatever). One way is to subsidize the domestic producers (this is 
politically unpopular because it is visible and results in either high taxes or lower government 
expenditure or other things), and another method is to rig the domestic market so that consumers have 
to pay the highest prices at which domestic producers can compete ( one way of achieving this result is 
through imposing protectionist trade barriers by squeezing imports, restrict supply and maintain prices 
at higher levels than would otherwise apply). The purpose is to confer rents on the producers in the 
distorting country.  
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 South Africa faced mad cow decease (FMD/BSE scare) outbreak and in December 
2000 all imports from Namibia and other neighbouring countries into Southern Africa 
were banned. During the same period the EU raised its subsidies on beef Exports to 
South Africa. The ban on meat imports and the added subsidized EU imports made it 
extremely hard for Namibian meat to compete.  The poor communal farmers were the 
hardest hit as exports to the EU from these areas were banned and the South Africa 
market was of crucial importance to these exporters.50  
 
The Food Safety, Sanitary and Phythosanitary (SPS) requirements for the export of 
meat from Namibia51 to the EU have been a major obstacle for market access.52 Only 
Meatco is certified to export meat to the EU to the exclusion of the communal farmers 
and only boneless meat can be exported. These measures have had a significant 
impact on the industry and it has suffered major financial losses and had to put 
expensive machinery in place to meat the SPS standards as a consequence.53 These 
potential WTO disputes were settled to the detriment of the Namibian Industries, who 
had to accept the market conditions (or maybe the costs of litigating at the WTO may 
have outweighed the gains from trade).  
 
In Namibia there are currently no mechanisms (except for the NTF, which as 
discussed above may not be able to address the need for stakeholder participation in 
the initiation of WTO trade disputes) in place to ensure that the WTO covered 
                                                 
50 The Meat Board estimated a loss in excess of US$13 million as a result of the EU subsidy. Namibia 
lodged a formal request for the EU to rescind its decision. http://www.fews.net accessed May 10, 2007. 
Safe to say that the subsidies in the European Union still exist, the outcome of the formal request could 
not be accessed during the research conducted.  . 
51 Beef exported from Namibia comes from cattle that are reared in a natural environment, without 
growth hormones and regular use of antibiotics. http://www.economist.com.na , accessed May, 9, 
2007.  
52 The underlying intent in the formulation of the SPS Agreement was to facilitate unhindered 
international trade in animals, plants and their products without endangering human, animal or plant 
life (Article 2, and the chapeau to the agreement). An important concept embedded within the 
Agreement is to ensue that governments do not use sanitary measures related to the import of animal 
products as unjustified trade barriers to protect their own domestic livestock industries from 
competitive imports (Article 5). To enable scientifically justifiable baseline for consistency in decision 
making, member countries are encouraged to base their decisions on international standards where they 
exist or if the sanitary standards set by the importing country is higher than an international standard, 
on such standards (Article 3). http://www.wto.org accessed May 1, 2007; see also, Bruckner G.K. 
Tralac Working Paper No. 6/2005, October 2005, 1-60, 4. 
53To date the EU still bans bone-in and for the Namibian producer (Meatco), putting measures in place 
to meat these non-tariff barriers is expensive and difficult to overcome.  
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agreements are implemented correctly or to measure compliance by importers and 
exporters unless the other trading partner raises the issue.   
 
The private sector in Namibia is aware of the WTO covered agreements but view the 
process as tedious and expensive and these deter them from putting measures in place 
to give effect thereto.54  
 
What is worrying about the whole set up is the lack of co-ordination between these 
various fora as well as the non-stop, costly meetings which sometimes bear no fruits 
and more alarming is that the procedures do not deal with an eventuality of a trade 
dispute by or against Namibia at the WTO forum. Further to this, the NTF OPR at 
provision 7.2, provide that “[D]ecisions taken by the members shall not be binding on 
the Ministry of Trade & Industry or the Government of the Republic of Namibia but 
shall convey the recommendations of the Public Sector to the Government.” 
Reference to the Public Sector in this provision, must be accepted as a typographical 
error and this paper will assume that the correct word is Private Sector in order to 
show the dilemma that the private sector is faced with.55
 
When measured against the political interests and pressure the government may in all 
respect be exposed to from the major trading WTO members, the provision is 
alarming as the mere conveyance of “recommendations” may not be convincing 
enough for government to take the matter further. The industry may be left out in the 
cold to face the trade distorting measures it is being exposed to. The NTF is 
financially dependent on the MTI and this may have an impact on the decision 
making. 
 
Like the regulatory framework in place in the US an EU and the informal Australian 
provisions discussed in chapter four, below, the final decision to initiate or not initiate 
a trade dispute at the WTO DSB for Namibia is vested with its MTI. The dilemma 
faced by the industry in the event that they regard the case as one validating the 
                                                 
54 Reply received from a member of the stakeholder group of Namibia as an answer to a question posed 
in the questionnaire used for data collection during the research for this paper. Also see 
www.economist.com.na accessed May 9, 2007.  
55A copy of the Operational Rules and Procedures of the NTF is attached as an annexure to this paper. 
Permission to attach this document has not been obtained, however the copy was provided in reply to 
the questionnaire directed to the NTF. 
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initiation of a dispute, must be weighed up against the government’s interest as the 
member and guardian of the implementation and enforcement of the WTO covered 
agreements. Although this method is not entirely without merit, in the sense that it 
affords government and the private sector a realistic means of response, it has been 
noted for its opacity and instability because it would seem to leave issues to the 
government’s discretion.56 Moreover, the ministry in charge varies depending upon 
the affected sector.   
 
The possibility of ever getting involved in a Trade dispute at the WTO level is very 
low in Namibia. Namibia regards South Africa as their major trading partner viewing 
their relationship as one of mutual benefit. This may explain the modest approach 
taken when the South African Dairy products flooded the market which was arguably 
a form of dumping. This paper recognizes the strong commercial and Trade flow 
between these two countries but globalization and the WTO commitments call for 
greater market access and there will be many more Nations trading with Namibia. It 
must thus put measures in place to deal with its current trading partners as well as 
prospective future trading partners that may engage in conduct which is not WTO 
compliant. The approach57 taken by Namibia in dealing with the trade distorting 
measures faced by its industries illustrated above, confirms the argument that small 
developing states may feel constrained from initiating a case against their larger trade 
partners because they do not anticipate that they will be able to gain concessions or 
because they fear losing aid or preferential trade.58  
3.3. Stakeholder participation in SACU 
The main question is why and how should SACU play a role in facilitating increased 
stakeholder participation within the Union for the mutual benefit of its members? 
 
                                                 
56Keidanren N. (2004) 2.  
57 An approach that seem to have gone unnoticed, but of significant importance is that of Musoti V. 
(2003). Where he suggests for the establishment of an advisory center, to be located at a university (in 
the case of Namibia such center can either be located at the university of Namibia or the Polytechnic of 
Namibia). Academics from the institute will work with the Ministry of Trade and Industry or the line 
Ministry of the affected industry. Primary research can be conducted by academics or graduates or 
both, and a memorandum of Understanding like the ones between NTF and the lobby groups, can be 
entered into between the Ministry of Trade and industry, jointly with NTF and the University or 
Polytechnic of Namibia (whichever one is more beneficial for the research work anticipated). 
58Supra Davis, C.L. and Bermeo, S.L. (2006) 7.  
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SACU can play a dynamic role in the process of facilitating increased participation of 
its member country stakeholders in the initiation of trade disputes firstly because it 
has fewer members than other regional arrangements such as SADC59 or COMESA60. 
Namibia is a member of SACU since attainment of her independence in 1991. The 
customs union represents the most important trading partners for Namibia and for that 
reason the writer argues that having a mechanism in Namibia which will be 
complimented by a higher ranking and regional mechanism at the SACU level will be 
a means to accomplishing stakeholder participation in the initiation of trade dispute at 
the WTO.61
 
The SACU agreement62 seeks to entrench a democratic approach to trade policy while 
minimizing revenue instability during a period of declining tariffs.63
 
SACU can establish a branch where member state stakeholders can seek legal opinion 
in the event that their governments veto the initiation of a dispute. SACU may avail 
itself to providing the parties with an independent legal opinion which may or may 
not influence the decision of either party (stakeholders or government). Where a 
dispute is between member states the forum can be used to try and resolve the dispute 
or direct possible less trade distorting measures that member states can put in place to 
lesson the impact on the industry. Serving as an independent party at the disposal of 
member state governments and stakeholders will be beneficial and may contribute to 
lessening the costs involved in the process of obtaining legal advice or preparing the 
                                                 
59Short for:  Southern African Development Community. 
60 Short for: Common Market for Eastern an Southern Africa. 
61 The most important function of SACU is the collection of customs and excise duties. This is done 
through the South African National Revenue fund and the revenue is shared among the members 
(Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland) on the basis of a revenue-sharing formula. 
These revenues provide a significant source of revenue for the not so international trade exposed 
member countries, being the BNLS (All member countries except for South Africa) countries. The 
renegotiation of the SACU agreement in 2002 supports the need for the customs union to play an active 
role in the creation of a stakeholder participation mechanism. 
62 The new agreement at is said to be more comprehensive and includes the following objectives set out 
in Article 2: 
• To promote the integration of Members into the global economy; 
• To facilitate cross-border movement of goods between the Members; 
• To establish effective, transparent and democratic institutions which will ensure equitable 
trade benefits to the Members; 
• To facilitate the equitable sharing of revenue from customs, excise and additional duties; 
• To promote fair competition, substantially increase investment and facilitate economic 
development; and 
To facilitate the development of common policies and strategies.  
63 Kirk, R. and Stern, M. (2003) 1. Also quoted in Grant Catherine (2006) 2.  
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complaint, respondent, or third party participation of a member country at the WTO 
DSB. In the event that it is required to render advice in a dispute between its member 
states, such advice can be rendered on a first come first service basis and may serve as 
an arena for the settlement of the dispute to avoid the more expensive WTO DSS. 
 
Where the measures forming the subject matter of the complaint have been taken by a 
common trading partner of all member states, the SACU mechanism can be used in 
the process from the initiation stage, preparation and fling of briefs. The SACU 
mechanism can also assist the member state stakeholders by providing expertise on 
WTO law where it has such expertise, and in this way lesson the possibility of 
members engaging in possible WTO violations and enable them to identify possible 
trade distorting measures taken by trading partners.64  
 
3.4.  CONCLUSSION 
The chapter illustrates that developing countries like Namibia have taken initiatives to 
put mechanisms in place that will facilitate the participation of stakeholders in the 
process of giving effect to the country’s WTO commitments. However the mechanism 
does not address the element of initiating trade disputes at the WTO, let alone the 
participation of stakeholders in such a process. SACU as a regional arrangement is a 
suitable forum to facilitate the process of stakeholder participation in the WTO DS 
process but is has no mechanism in place but has future plans for such mechanism. It 
is thus safe to conclude that in SSA there is a need for a stakeholder participation 
model which may result in participation by the SSA countries in the DSU. The next 
chapter undertakes a comparative analysis of formal and informal stakeholder 
participation models in place in the US, EU and Australia and some developing 
countries who have participated in the WTO DS process.    
 
 
      
 
                                                 
64There are plans under the auspices of SACU for the establishment of a notification mechanism. These 
plans have been approved by the SACU council but the detail of the envisaged mechanism was not 
available at the time of compiling this paper. According to the questionnaire response, the current 
compliance evaluation is undertaken by the mission in Geneva at the WTO.  
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Chapter Four 
Comparative Study on Stakeholder Participation 
 
4.1. Evolution: How the participation of Stakeholders evolved 
 
The paper calls for stakeholder participation and thus necessitates an elucidation of 
the evolution of stakeholder participation at the International Fora. Although the 
writers do not use the word stakeholders when they refer to the private sector actors in 
the economy of a country, the evolution of the role of these actors can be traced from 
the rigid divide between the roles of private and public players; followed by the 
Institutional Economist who refer to a mechanism of coordination between private 
and public; and governance through public private networks.65  
 
Traditionally, social scientists have treated government as distinct from civil society 
and created what is commonly referred to as the public-private dichotomy.66 Social 
scientists such as Max Weber (1946)67 refers to the relationship as one within which 
the state governs civil society and hence the state does not enter into a governance 
network with civil society. Robert Dahl (1976)68 advocates on the concept of 
“polyarchy” where political leader’s control of the state is legitimated through a 
pluralist democratic political process and like Weber, he states that there is a 
difference between the role of the government (public) and the governed (private). 
Joseph Grieco’s (1990)69 International relations theory also reflected this public-
private dichotomy with an emphasis on the role of state power in shaping and 
deploying international regimes to advance state interests.70  
The private–public dichotomy is reflected in a similar way by Institutional economist. 
Their focus is on the mechanism used to coordinate and ultimately allocate resources 
                                                 
65Gregory C. Shaffer, (2003) 10-18.  
66Id.  
67 Weber Max. (1946)  translated by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 239. 
Weber Max. (1947) 154. 
Quoted by Gregory C. Shaffer, (2003) 2003, 10. 
68Dahl Robert. (1976) 10. 
Dahl, Robert, and Lindblom C., (1976) 171, 227-36, 272-86., 11.    
69 Grieco Joseph M. (1990). 
70 Gregory C. Shaffer, (2003) 2003, 11. 
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and thereby determine economic outcomes. They refer to these mechanisms as 
systems of “governance” as opposed to government. Oliver Williams71 for example 
concentrates on the operations of firms but his idea is said to apply to political 
economy in general. Under the concept of hierarchy, governments allocate resources 
by command as, through acts of legislatures, courts and bureaucracies. Governments 
issue regulations, impose fines, and collect taxes. Markets, in contrast allocate 
resources through the uncoordinated decisions of individuals, as reflected in the price 
system. Markets are said to hence reflect a private ordering of goods, services, and 
wealth, in contrast to a hierarchical public alone.72
 
Shaffer (2003) refers to this as governance complementing public hierarchies and 
private markets; governance through public-private networks. These networks bring 
together public and private actors to address discrete policy issues and through this 
meeting blur the public-private distinction. Governments are delegating traditionally 
“public” functions to the private sector but in order to ensure that the desired outcome 
is achieved the government oversees the activities of the private actors. It can be 
perceived as the way in which western societies are increasingly being governed 
through “self organizing, inter-organizational networks” composed of public and 
private actors pursuing shared goals. Mixed networks of public and private actors 
coordinate in formulating and implementing public policy.73 In order to achieve the 
desired outcome government oversees the activities of the private actors. 
 
The idea that public functions are governed by shifting combinations of public and 
private actors is not entirely new. The blurring of the public and private domains has 
long been a subject of interest to legal realists and law and society scholars. The 
interdependency between the private and public spheres is said to be the latest 
development in this area. Public institutions have shifted responsibility for the 
provision of many services to the private and voluntary sectors through privatization 
                                                 
71 Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies, analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study 
in the Economics of International Organization. New York: Free Press. 
Williamson Oliver E. 1985. the Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting. New York: Free Press. 
Williamson Oliver E. 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford University Press. 
72Gregory C. Shaffer, (2003)  12. The stakeholder participation that this paper is calling for is more 
closely modeled after the last stage of development, namely governance through “public private 
networks.  
73 Id. 12-13. 
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and deregulation. The network established between government officials and private 
groups is brought about predominantly because of the resource interdependency 
between them. “A basic assumption of network relationships is that one party is 
dependent on resources controlled by another, and that there are gains to be had by the 
poling of resources.”74
 
 Not all public and private actors enjoy equal opportunities to participate in these 
networks and the relative power and influence of actors within these networks is 
determined by the diffusion of resources and actors’ per capita stake in outcomes. 
Actors hold different resources ranging from constitutional, legal, organizational, 
financial, political, and informational, to name a few. As Shaffer (2003) illustrates, by 
using the WTO as an example, public actors hold constitutional and legal powers that 
endow them with authority. In the WTO only member states may bring claims before 
the WTO DSB. In this way private actors depend on public authorities to represent 
their interests. Private actors, however, also have organizational, financial, political, 
and informational resources that can benefit public authorities. In the context of WTO 
dispute settlement, private associations have the financial means to hire legal experts 
to help develop legal arguments; hold essential information about the market place 
needed to develop the factual basis of legal claims; and deploy political resources 
through lobbying, campaign financial support, and public information campaigns.  In 
this way the public and private actors depend on each other’s resources to accomplish 
their respective goals.75
 
In addition to resources, participation also depends on actors’ relative stakes in the 
outcomes, particularly on the per capita benefits from participating as compared with 
informational and organizational costs to do so. “The character of an institutional 
participation is determined by the interaction between benefits of that participation 
and the costs of that participation…. Interest groups with small numbers but high per 
capita stakes have significant advantages in political action over interest groups with 
large numbers and smaller per capita stakes.”76  
                                                 
74 Gregory C. Shaffer, (2003), 14.  
75 Id. 15-16. 
76 The groups with high per capita stakes are more likely to obtain and provide information to the 
policymaking process and those with low per capita stakes are less likely to engage in policy 
strategizing, especially where the per capita benefits of fully understanding the issues and organizing 
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 At the international sphere, such as the WTO, governmental representatives remain 
the most important players in the public private-networks in international relations. 
With respect to cross-border networks, private actors still play the central role. As 
Firms and Trade Associations become repeat players in the legal challenge of trade 
barriers, they develop knowledge of how to strategically use the WTO process when 
needed.77
 
As the statistics indicate, the US and Europe have been the most frequent repeat 
actors in the WTO DSS and in the following chapter, their private-public networking 
will be used to demonstrate the current set up that has allowed stakeholders to 
participate in WTO dispute initiation.78 Australia, which has been a complainant 
seven times and a defendant in nine cases,79 was the only country where an informal 
mechanism exists, which has been documented and is accessible for the purpose of 
this paper. In the following section, the mechanism will be used as the closest 
comparison to the systems in place in the two leading WTO DSU participants.  
  
                                                                                                                                            
themselves are too low to justify the costs. Koesat, Neil. 1994. Imperfect alternatives: Choosing 
Institutions in law, Economics and Public policy: University of Chicago Press, 3, 6, 868. See also 
Shaffer 2003, 16. 
77 Id. 
78 http://www.wto.org accessed May 10, 2007. 
79 Id. Accessed May 27, 2007. 
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4.2.  Case Study : US , EC and Australia 
4.2.1. How U.S., EC and Australia adapted and enhanced their 
resources and abilities for participation under the WTO’s legalized 
dispute settlement system: 
 
In the developed countries the business interests in democracies have gained skills 
that help to support a litigation strategy. Firms are said to become accustomed to 
providing information to government and presenting their legal and national interests 
rather than private deal-making.80 The line of argument is that democracies are more 
likely to initiate due to their experience with the judicial process domestically. The 
paper argues that this argument is more relevant to developed nations because even in 
the African democracies where litigation thrives, this element has not had an impact 
on increased participation in the WTO DSS. Be that as it may, the way in which the 
successful democracies organize themselves may be used as guidance for the 
approach developing countries such as Namibia may consider in strengthening the 
mechanism between stakeholders and governments for increased participation in the 
WTO DSS.      
 
The U.S. and EC public authorities hold considerable resource advantage when 
participating in WTO litigation. For example, the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) employs many lawyers and these lawyers are supplemented 
by those in other U.S. departments, including from the Department of Commerce, 
Department of Agriculture, Department of the Treasury, Office of Patents and 
Trademarks, and Environmental Protection agency, as needed in individual WTO 
disputes.81   
By drawing a comparison between the dispute initiation systems in place in the three 
developed countries, two of which are active participants in the WTO DSS, one can 
provide some guidance on mechanisms that developing countries can put in place to 
                                                 
80 Bergstein, A. and Berger, P.L. (1997) 9-10. 
81 The Legal Services division of the European Commission employs lawyers that address WTO 
matters; this division is supplemented by hundreds of lawyers working in the commission’s Trade 
Directorate General (DG) and other DGs, including DG Agriculture, DG Enterprise, DG Internal 
Market and DG Consumer Affairs. These lawyers are typically graduates from leading U.S. and 
European universities in WTO law. Thus in a WTO dispute the collective expertise and experience 
favor the U.S. and/or EC. Gregory Shaffer (2003) 21-22. 
 32
encourage active participation of stakeholders in the initiation of trade disputes. The 
important components of the systems in place in the US, EU and Australia which will 
be compared are, the mechanisms regulating the process of dispute initiation, 
submission of complaints, (under this heading who submits, admissibility and time 
frames to initiate or not, will be set forth); internal consultations; consultations with 
third parties; examination procedure (of the information pertaining to the alleged 
complaint); obstacles to trade, unreasonable, unjustifiable or discriminatory acts; 
confidentiality; action that may be taken; termination of action and monitoring of 
implementation. The US and EU systems are formal in nature while the Australian 
system is informal. Where the discussion is silent on the measures in place in one or 
more off the selected discussions it must be taken that no such information could be 
found during the composition of this paper for that specific jurisdiction. 
4.2.2. Mechanisms regulating the process of dispute initiation 
 
The means through which economic operators can have their trade problems 
addressed by the Community, is stipulated in the EU Council Regulation (EC) No 
3286/94 of 22 Dec ember 1994 (referred to as EU Regulation). The mechanism is said 
to be a type of commercial defense mechanism aimed at strengthening the common 
commercial policy, particularly with regard to protection against illicit commercial 
practices.82 The Community procedures in the field of common commercial policy 
are laid down in the Regulation, particularly those established under the auspices of 
the WTO, which are aimed at responding to obstacles to trade having an effect on the 
market of the Community. The aim is the removal of the resulting injury. The 
Regulations, in Article 1, recognizes that international trade rules are primarily those 
established under the auspices of the WTO covered agreements and the annexes 
thereto but recognizes, in the preamble to the Regulations, that they can also include 
those rules laid down in any other agreement to which the Community is a party 
setting out rules applicable to trade between the Community and third countries. 
Article 1 provides that the procedures in the Regulation are to be applied to the 
                                                 
82  http://eur-lex.europa.eu accessed May 14, 2007. 
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initiation and subsequent conduct and termination of international dispute settlement 
procedures.83
 
The Regulation establishes procedural means through which private economic 
operators can request the Community institutions to react to obstacles to trade adopted 
or maintained by third countries which cause injury or otherwise adverse trade effects. 
The request can only be made where a right of action exists in respect of the alleged 
obstacle under applicable international trade rules.84 The preamble to the Regulation 
further confirms that the Community must act in compliance with its international 
obligations and, where such obligations result from agreements, maintain the balance 
of rights and obligations which it is the purpose of those agreements to establish. 
Measures taken under the EU procedures in question should also conform to the 
Community’s international obligations.85
 
 The U.S. resources are supplemented by those of large and well-organized companies 
and commercial groups located within them that actively follow WTO matters. These 
Multinational firms are the world’s largest traders and are consequently the most 
directly affected by the details and interpretive nuances of agreed rules. These firms 
have a substantial interest in the outcome of WTO disputes concerning themselves or 
the specific industry they participate. They have the resources to help public 
authorities engage in complex, prolonged litigation in a remote forum, which they are 
willing to dedicate to these issues because of their stakes. The interests of these 
multinational companies, although not identical, are closely linked with those of their 
home countries.86  
 
                                                 
83 http://eur-lex.europa.eu accessed May 14, 2007. Also referred to in Maonera F. Initiation of WTO 
Trade Disputes by the private sector – need for SADC/COMESA countries to develop national 
mechanisms, tralac Working Paper, No 15/2006, October 2006,1-41, 16. 
84 Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 of 22 December 1994, the  Preamble;In Fédération des 
industries condimentaires de France (FICF) and Others v. Commission of the European Communities, 
ECJ, T-317/02, the court, ad paragraph 44, held that; “It must be observed as a preliminary point that, 
under Regulation No 3286/94, exercise of the right of action by the Community under international 
trade rules against an obstacle to trade adopted or maintained by a third country and having an effect on 
the market of that country requires as a minimum that three cumulative conditions be satisfied, namely 
the existence of an obstacle to trade, as defined in the regulation, the presence of adverse trade effects 
which result from that obstacle and the need to take action in the interests of the Community.” 
85See footnote 67 above.  
86 Supra, Shaffer, G. (2003) 23. 
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In the US, the means by which US citizens may petition the US government to 
investigate and act against potential violation(s) of international trade agreements, is 
provided for under Section 301 to 310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter referred 
to as the trade Act). In terms of Section 302(a)(1), any interested person may file a 
petition with the USTR87, requesting that action be taken and setting forth the 
allegations in support of the request. In addition to other requirements, in order to 
bring an action in terms of the Act one must show that the breaches have had impacts 
on individual economic operators and that the complaint emanates from individual 
economic operators.88
 
The informal system in Australia has a WTO Trade Law Branch which is part of its 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade which acts as the WTO dispute enquiry 
point. The Branch receives complaints from an exporter who considers that its 
competitive position is affected by the trade-restrictive actions of another WTO 
member. The Branch examines the details of the case, determines the nature of the 
barrier, particularly, whether or not it is a breach of WTO rules and establishes 
possible options for action that can be taken. The options could include official 
                                                 
87 The USTR is part of the Executive Office of the President http://www.osec.doc.gov accessed April, 
14, 2007. 
88 In United States – Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974: 1999 WT/DS152/R, the EU bought a 
claim before a WTO Panel alleging that; 
• by imposing strict time limits within which unilateral determinations must be made and trade 
sanctions taken, sections 306 and 305 of the Trade Act do not allow the US to comply with 
the rules of the DSU in situations where a prior multilateral ruling under the DSU on 
conformity of measures taken pursuant to implementation of DSB recommendations has not 
been adopted by the DSB.   
• the DSU procedure resulting in a multilateral finding, even if initiated immediately after the 
end of the reasonable period of time for implementation, cannot be finalised, nor can 
subsequent DSU procedure for seeking compensation or suspension of concessions be 
complied with, within the time limits of sections 306 and 305.   
• Title III, chapter 1(sections 301-310) of the Trade Act, as amended, and in particular sections 
306 and 305 of the Act, are inconsistent with Articles 3, 21, 22 and 23 of the DSU; Article 
XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement; and Articles I, II, III, VIII and XI of GATT 1994.   
• the Trade Act nullifies and impairs benefits accruing, directly or indirectly, to it under GATT 
1994, and also impedes the objectives of GATT 1994 and of the WTO. 
The report of the panel was circulated to Members on 22 December 1999. The Panel found that 
Sections 304(a)(2)(A), 305(a) and 306(b) of the US Trade Act of 1974 were not inconsistent with 
Article 23.2(a) or (c) of the DSU or with any of the GATT 1994 provisions cited. The panel noted that 
its findings were based in full or in part on US undertakings articulated in the Statement of 
Administrative Action approved by the US Congress at the time it implemented the Uruguay Round 
agreements and confirmed in the statements by the US to the panel. The panel stated therefore that 
should those undertakings be repudiated or in any other way removed, its findings of conformity would 
no longer be warranted. The DSB adopted the panel report. 
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consultations with the government of the trading partner in question, aimed at settling 
the matter. In cases where there are clear issues of inconsistency with WTO rules and 
where bilateral consultations have not been successful, there is the option of initiating 
a formal WTO complaint under WTO dispute procedures.  The final decision on the 
initiating a dispute lies with the Minister for Trade.89
 
The systems in place in these three jurisdictions do not provide a for a right of the 
private economic stakeholder to compel the government or the Community to initiate 
the dispute settlement mechanism, but only provides for a right of the stakeholder to 
have his complaint formally investigated. From a reading of paragraph 7.2 of the 
Operational Rules and Procedure of the NTF, it is safe to say that Namibia adopts the 
same approach. The approach has its advantages and disadvantages depending on 
which side you are on. If the stakeholders are allowed to compel the initiation of 
disputes they interfere with the government’s right as signatory and member of WTO 
to weigh up the benefit of initiating a dispute against the economic loss to the country 
and the maintenance of good trading relations with other nations. On the other hand, a 
stakeholder’s inability to compel the initiation of a dispute by the government can be 
detrimental to the stakeholders business if the trade-distorting measures continue, or 
where the decision by the government not to initiate is solely based on political 
considerations.90  
 
4.2.3. Submission of complaints 
4.2.3.1. Who can submit? 
In the EU complaints may be lodged by any natural person, or any association, acting 
on behalf of a Community industry (Article 3(1)); any community enterprise 
(company), or association, acting on behalf of one or more Community enterprises 
                                                 
89 http://www.dfat.gov.au accessed May, 14, 2007. Also referred to in Maonera F. (2006), Supra, at 19.  
90 An example of the exercise of discretion by the relevant authority can be found in Section 302(a)(2) 
of the Trade Act. The USTR has to review the allegations in any petition filed, and determine whether 
or not to initiate an investigation. In determining whether to initiate an investigation of any act, policy, 
or practice, the USTR has discretion to determine whether the requested action would be effective in 
addressing such act, policy or practice (Section 302(c)). The USTR is not required to initiate an 
investigation with respect to any act, policy, or practice of a foreign country if he determines that the 
initiation of the investigation would be detrimental to United States economic interest (Section 
302(b)(2)(B)).   
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(Article 4(1)); who has suffered injury/adverse effects as a result of obstacles to trade 
that have effected the market of the Community/third country may lodge a complaint; 
or any Member State (Article 6(1) may ask the Commission to initiate the procedure. 
The difference between the parties who may lodge a complaint in the EU and at the 
USTR in the US is that in the US any interested person can file a petition with the 
USTR requesting action to be taken (Section 302(a)(1) while the Commission only 
permits complaints being lodged on behalf of a community industry or enterprise 
(Article 3(1) and 4(1) above).91 Section 301(d)(9) defines ‘Interested person’ as 
inclusive of, but not limited to, domestic firms and workers, representatives of 
consumer interests, United States product exporters, and any industrial user of goods 
or services that may be affected by actions taken. 
 
The USTR is authorised to initiate investigations on its own initiative.92 This is not 
true in the case of the Commission.93 In Australia the system permits for complaints 
to be submitted by Firms/Companies or their nominated legal representatives.94
 
In all three jurisdictions under comparison, the party filing a complaint is required to 
set out the alleged conduct that the transgressor is engaged in and the injury suffered. 
The EU and US regulation is more strictly worded than the Australian provision.95 
This requirement evidences the need to have individuals equipped with the necessary 
expertise on International Trade law employed in these departments. 
 
                                                 
91 http://ec.europa.eu accessed May, 14, 2007. 
92 Us Trade Act Section 301(a) and Section 302(c).  
93 Article 3(1), Article 4(1) and Article 6(1) of the EU Regulation 3286/94 does not authorize the 
commission on its own initiative. 
94 http://www.dfat.gov.au accessed May, 14, 2007. 
95 In the EU, the regulation in require that, for a complaint to be admissible, it must be in writing and 
must contain sufficient evidence of the existence of the obstacles to trade and of the injury resulting 
therefrom. A complaint made by a community enterprise under Article 4(1) shall only be admissible if 
the obstacle to trade alleged therein is the subject of a right of action established under international 
trade rules laid down in a multilateral or plurilateral agreement. Section 302(a)(1) and (2) of the US 
Trade Act provides that a person filing the petition should set forth the allegations in support of the 
request which the USTR is to consider and determine whether to initiate an investigation. The 
Australian provision requires that a complaint provide details of the problem alleged and the adverse 
impact on exports or imports. Upon receipt of such complaint the WTO Law Branch will examine the 
details of the case; determine the nature of the barrier, in particular whether it could be a breach of 
WTO rules, and then develop a possible option for action. 
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4.2.3.2. The decision to initiate or not to initiate 
In Europe, Article 5(3) of the Regulations requires the Commission to inform the 
complainant, where it becomes apparent that the complaint does not provide sufficient 
evidence to justify initiating an investigation. A similar requirement is set out under 
the US Trade Act and in terms of which the USTR upon making a determination not 
to initiate an investigation with respect to a petition, shall inform the petitioner of the 
reasons and publish a notice of the determination, together with a summary of such 
reasons, in the Federal Register. If the USTR determines that the initiation of the 
investigation would be detrimental to the US economic interest, he/she is not required 
to initiate an investigation with respect to any such act, policy or practice of a foreign 
country.96 In Australia, upon receipt of such complaint the WTO Law Branch will 
examine the details of the case; determine the nature of the barrier, in particular 
whether it could be a breach of WTO rules, and then develop a possible option for 
action.97
 
4.2.3.3. Consultations  
Mechanisms for internal consultation between the relevant trade authority and the 
stakeholders representing the affected industry are provided for in all three 
jurisdictions. However the EU because of its member state set up, has a procedure for 
consultations between the Advisory Committee and representatives of the Member 
States (Article 7) and consultations with interested parties but this process is set in 
motion by the Commission itself upon a finding that sufficient evidence exist to 
justify initiation of a examination procedure.98. 
 
In the US before making a determination in terms of Section 304(a)(1)(A) and 
304(a)(1)(B) and where expeditious action is not required, the USTR shall provide an 
opportunity for the presentation of views by interested persons, including a public 
hearing if requested by any interested person. In terms of Section 304 (b) of the Trade 
Act, the USTR is also required to obtain advice from the appropriate committees and 
may request the views of the United States International Trade Commission regarding 
                                                 
96Section 302(2)(B) of the US Trade Act of 1974. 
97 See footnote 78 above. 
98 Article 8(1) and 8(2). 
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the probable impact on the economy of the US of the taking of action with respect to 
any goods or service. 
 
Although the decision to initiate a WTO dispute, as stated in the preceding 
paragraphs, rests with the Minister for Trade, in practice a decision taken is based on 
advice and views of the affected industry sectors, and the views of other government 
agencies. A domestic stakeholder group is established for each dispute and anyone 
fitting the description of the specific stakeholders may join the group. Stakeholders 
are consulted and briefed throughout the dispute and their expertise is used in 
collecting and strengthening the evidence. Industries are at liberty to raise concerns 
through the established networks of Government and Departmental Liaison groups 
with the private sector.99
 
4.2.3.4. Consultations with Third countries 
All three jurisdictions have made provision to consult with third countries during the 
process of initiating a WTO trade dispute. It is suggested that this approach may have 
been motivated by a realisation that an agreement with a third country may be the 
most appropriate means to resolve a dispute arising from an obstacle to trade.100 The 
Trade Act in Sections 302 to 303 provides for requesting consultation on the date of 
initiation of an investigation by the USTR and where investigations have been 
initiated not at the instance of the USTR, the provisions of Section 10(c) apply. The 
essence of these provisions is that consultations must be undertaken with the aim of 
negotiating a resolution which can eliminate practices which are the subject matter of 
the investigation as soon as possible. The EU Regulations provide that the 
Commission officially notifies the representatives of the country or countries which 
are the subject of the procedure, with which, where appropriate, consultations may be 
held.101 In Australia the opinion of the WTO Law Branch in determining whether or 
not the trade barrier complained of could be a breach of WTO rules, could in its 
option for possible action that can be taken, include official consultations with the 
government of the trading partner in question.  According to the Branch, the latter 
                                                 
99 Supra, Maonera F. (2006) 22. 
100 Id.  23. 
101Article 8.1 (b) of the Council of The European Union Regulation 3286/94 of December 1994, 
http://ec.europa.eu accessed May, 15, 2007. 
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approach is regarded as the more efficient and cost-effective way to settle disputes 
that having recourse to full-blown proceedings.102
 
4.2.3.5. Examination procedure 
In both the US Trade Act and EU Regulations provision is made for examination 
procedure. The procedure, briefly, is an opportunity for the relevant authority to 
publish information on the product or service and the countries concerned in the 
investigations. The procedure creates a platform for parties primarily concerned to 
give their input, consult with each other and opposing parties so as to crystallize the 
issues pertaining to the investigation. Publication of the subject matter of the 
investigation is made in official notices (in the case of the USTR it is known as the 
Federal Register). The Europeans have a process of requesting permission from a 
third country to conduct on-site investigations within the country’s borders. In the US 
the USTR has the power to issue regulations concerning the filing as well as conduct 
of investigations and hearings and in that way the petitioner is regularly informed of 
the progress of the investigations. The examination process enables the relevant 
authority to make a determination on whether to terminate the investigations, 
conclude an agreement with the third party to resolve the matter or may give the third 
country an opportunity to consider removing the measures which are the subject 
matter of the investigation or putting measures in place that may result in termination 
of the investigations.103  
 
4.2.3.6. Acts which trigger enforcement action by the relevant 
authorities   
In the EU Regulations these acts are referred to as obstacles to trade and are defined 
in Article 2(1) as including ‘any trade practice adopted or maintained by a third 
country in respect of which international trade rules establish a right of action. The 
regulations further define what is considered as adverse trade effects in Article 2(4). 
The situations under which these adverse effects may arise are specified in Article 
                                                 
102 See note 78 above. 
103 See Article 8(1), 8(5), 8(6), 11 and 11(3) of the EU Regulations and Section 302(a)(4)(A), 
302(a)(4)(B) and 309 of the US Trade Act of 1974. See also Maonera Supra, at 24-25.  
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10(4), and Article 10(1) sets out what should be included when an examination of the 
injury is undertaken.  
The US Act authorises the USTR to take action if he/she determines that there is ‘in 
existence acts, policies, and practices that are unreasonable, unjustifiable or 
discriminatory’. The wording is much wider than that of the EU and allows for a 
wider variety of acts to give rise to an action under the Act. Unreasonable acts are 
said to include, but are not limited to, any act, policy, or practice, or any combination 
of acts, policies, or practices, which denies fair and equitable opportunities for the 
establishment of an enterprise, provision of adequate and effective protection of 
intellectual property rights notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country may be in 
compliance with the specific obligations of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of intellectual Property rights.104
  
The Australian system refers to trade barriers which could include arbitrary or 
discriminatory tariffs, quotas, internal tax rates or product standards and subsidies that 
act as export incentives.105
 
4.2.3.7. Confidential treatment of information 
In both the US Trade Act and EU Regulations, provision is made for the confidential 
treatment of information received pursuant to the Act or Regulations respectively. The 
major difference is that the US Act regards information received, safe for limited 
exceptions, as non-confidential and to be available to any person, unless certified as 
business confidential.106 The Regulations do not specify whether the information will 
be regarded as confidential upon receipt, but provides that “shall be used only for the 
purpose for which it was requested”.107 The Regulations specify when information is 
                                                 
104 The tolerance by a foreign government of systemic anticompetitive activities by enterprises that 
have the effect of restricting, on a basis inconsistent with commercial considerations, access to US 
goods or services to a foreign market, is also considered to be unreasonable (US Trade Act of 1974, 
Section 301(d)(3)(B)). Unjustifiable acts, policies, and practises include any act, policy, or practice 
which denies national or most-favoured-nation or the right of establishment or protection of intellectual 
property rights (Section 301(d)(4)(B)). These acts, policy, or practices regarded as discriminatory when 
they deny national or most-favoured-nation treatment to US goods, services, or investment (Section 
301(d)(5)).  
105 http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/policy_investig_disputes.html accessed May, 15, 2007. 
106 Supra, US Trade Act, Section 308(c)(1)(A). 
107 Supra, EU Regulations, Article 9(1). 
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considered confidential.108 In both jurisdictions there is provision for a party to 
request that information provided is treated confidentially. The US Act refers to the 
process as certification while the Regulations refer to confidential treatment. Where a 
request is made for information to be treated as confidential the party making the 
request is required to include a non-confidential summary of the information.109 The 
Australian guidelines are silent on the issue of confidentiality.110
 
4.2.3.8. Action that my be taken by the relevant regulatory body 
Upon satisfying the requirements of Section 304(a)(1)(A)(1)(i) and (ii) and making a 
determination on the appropriate action to take in terms of Section 304(1)(B), the 
USTR is authorised to suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of benefits of 
trade agreement concessions to foreign country (Section 301(c)(1)(A)), and impose 
duties or other import restrictions on the goods of, and fees or restrictions on the 
services of such foreign country, for such time as it determines appropriate (Section 
301(c)(1)(B)). The action by the USTR may be taken against any goods or economic 
sector of the foreign country without regard as to whether or not such goods or 
economic sector were involved in the act, policy or practice that is the subject matter 
of such action.111 Any action can be taken by the USTR that falls within the 
presidential powers with respect to trade in any good or service, or with respect to any 
other area of pertinent relations with the foreign country. Action taken to eliminate the 
act, policy or practice must be devised so as to affect goods or services of the foreign 
country in an amount equivalent in value to the burden or restriction being imposed 
by that country on the U.S. commerce. Action may only be taken on or after the date 
on which a petition is filed or a determination to initiate an investigation is made by 
the USTR. 
 
In terms of Article 12(3) where, subsequent to the examination procedure, it is found 
that an action is necessary in the interest of the Community, any commercial policy 
measures may be taken which are compatible with existing international obligations 
                                                 
108 Id. at Article 9(3) and 9(2)(b). 
109 EU Regulation, Article 9(2)(b) and 9(4); US Trade Act, Section308(c)(1)(A) and 308(c)(B) and (C). 
110http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/wto_disputes.html#help accessed May 15, 2007.  
111 In In Fédération des Industries Condimentaires de France (FICF) and Others v. Commission of the 
European Communities, ECJ, T-317/02, the French company was opposing action taken in terms of 
this provision. 
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and procedures, and may include the suspension or withdrawal of any concession 
resulting from commercial policy negotiations; the raising of existing customs duties 
or the introduction of any other charge on imports; and the introduction of 
quantitative restrictions or any other measures modifying import or export conditions 
or otherwise affecting trade with a third country concerned. The reasons upon which 
the decision is based must be set out and are published in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities. The publication made in terms of this Article is deemed to 
constitute a notification to the countries and parties primarily concerned with the 
investigation (Article 12(4)) Where the Community’s international obligations require 
the prior discharge of an international procedure of consultation or the settlement of 
disputes, the measures to be taken can only be decided on after the consultation 
procedure has been terminated and should take into account the results of such 
consultations(Article 12(4)).112  
 
The U.S. Act as well as the EU Regulations provide for the approach to be adopted in 
the event that a measure has been referred to an International Body for the 
determination/settlement of a dispute. The U.S Act specifically refers to the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body and provides that the USTR is not required to take action in 
any case in which the DSU issued a ruling under formal DSP, provided that under any 
other trade agreement the USTR finds that “(i) the rights of the United States under a 
trade agreement are not being denied, or (ii) the act or practice (I) is not a violation of 
or inconsistent with the rights of the US, or (II) does not deny, nullify, or impair 
benefits to the United States under any trade agreement.”113 Article 12(2) of the EU 
Regulation provides that “where the Community has requested an international 
dispute settlement body to indicate and authorise the measures which are appropriate 
for the implementation of the results of an international dispute settlement procedure, 
the Community commercial policy measures which may be needed in consequence of 
such authorization shall be in accordance with the recommendation of such 
international dispute settlement body.”114  
 
                                                 
112 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/tbr/legis/reg_12.htm accessed May 15, 2007. 
113 U.S. Trade Act, supra. at Section 301(2)(A). 
114 See note 97 above. 
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4.2.3.9. Procedure for termination of action taken 
Except for the provisions on termination provided for under Article 11115 of the 
Regulations, the EU Commission does not a provision dealing with the termination of 
action taken against a third party. The US Trade Act allows termination by the USTR 
subject to specific conditions, including, the directions of the president in terms of 
Section 307(a)(1)(B)(C). Before taking a decision to terminate or modify the action, 
the USTR must (the word shall is used in the Act, making it peremptory) consult with 
the petitioner (if any), the representatives of the domestic industry concerned, and 
must provide an opportunity for the presentation of views by other interested persons 
affected by the proposed modification or termination on their effects and must 
consider the appropriateness of any such modification or termination (Section 
307(a)(1)).  
 
The US Trade Act specifies the timeframe within which action must be taken as four 
years and in the event that the action is not filed to the USTR during the last 60days of 
the four year period such action lapses (Section 307( c)(1)(A)(B) The USTR is 
required to notify the party (petitioner or representative), by mail, at least 60 days 
before the termination date of the looming termination. 
 
4.2.3.10. Monitoring of implementation of the determination made 
The USTR is, in terms of Section 306(a) of the Trade Act, required to monitor the 
implementation of each measure undertaken, or agreement that is entered into to 
ensure that the mater is satisfactorily resolved. If it finds that the measure(s) or 
agreement is not satisfactorily implemented, the USTR must determine what future 
action should be taken (Section 306(b)(1). With regard to measures or agreement to 
be implemented pursuant to recommendations made in proceedings before the WTO 
DSB, and where the USTR determines that a foreign country has failed to implement 
the recommendations, it can determine further action that has to be taken to remedy 
the non compliance. Before making such a determination it must engage in 
consultations with the petitioner and also provide opportunity for interested parties to 
present their views (Section 306(c)).   
                                                 
115 See discussion on examination procedure above. 
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The USTR is able to get the input and views from different states through its 
consultations with the committees and the ability to seek the advice/opinion of its 
International Trade Commission contributes significantly to making a decision to 
initiate a trade dispute or not. The Commission obtains this input from member states 
and concerned parties.116 In developing countries the input of economists working for 
either their Ministry of Trade and Industry or Ministry of Economic cooperation and 
Development (whatever name assigned) can have an input on a determination of 
whether or not to initiate a trade dispute. This may however not be effective in a 
country like Namibia where the NTF is part of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and 
the input is not as independent. 
 
A developing country that has been active in creating a coordinated system of 
addressing possible WTO dispute initiation has been Brazil. A three pillar structure 
for WTO dispute settlement has been developed, consisting of a specialized WTO 
dispute settlement division located in its capital Brasilia (this is referred to as the first 
pillar), coordination between this unit and Brazil’s WTO mission in Geneva117 (the 
second pillar), and coordination between both of these entities with Brazil’s private 
                                                 
116 The U.S. and EC use of the WTO dispute settlement system involves dependency by the trade 
officials on input from private parties despite their already significant resource advantages. Building a 
strong WTO legal case requires an intense exchange between the relevant public authority and private 
firms. The process requires industry to submit convincing factual and legal memoranda as a 
prerequisite to the filing of a WTO complaint. The collaboration among large private interest and 
government officials enhances the resources that the USTR and the Commission wield in WTO 
litigation, increasing their advantages against weaker WTO members. U.S. and EC public officials 
have collaborated with affected U.S. and EC private enterprises and their legal counsel in order to 
enhance their chances of prevailing in costly, time-intensive WTO litigation which further exacerbates 
litigation resource asymmetries. Shaffer, Supra 31. 
117In comparison, the majority developing countries have a single diplomatic mission for UN and WTO 
members and UN representation enjoying greater hierarchical importance within the foreign affairs 
ministry. Others have a one-man manned mission which makes it impossible for the individual to 
attend to pertinent matters such as the participation in the WTO DSU by the member country. Some 
developing countries have adapted to the great demands of their membership through creating a 
separate ambassador for WTO matters, a separate diplomatic mission, or a separate WTO unit within 
the embassy. Capacity constraints are more important than power considerations in the calculation by 
developing states of whether to initiate a dispute against a particular country. It was found that in the 
year 2000, 70% of developing country members of the WTO did not have the minimum of four staff 
based in Geneva. This minimum number of representatives is considered necessary for effective 
representation in WTO meetings across the different areas of WTO policy. To date Namibia, for 
example has one Charge d’ffaires in Geneva and another person attached to its office in Brussels 
representing the Agriculture industry at the EU. Whether these two individuals have some co-operation 
agreement is not clear but one would think it more likely.  
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sector and law firms hired by it (the third pillar).118 The situation in Japan is that 
Japanese companies and associations are able to register complaints about unfair trade 
practices of foreign nations to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry during 
the compilation of the annually published “Report on the WTO Consistency of Trade 
Policies by Major Trading Partners”. But there is no procedure for requesting 
initiation of an investigation with the aim of correcting the problems. The only 
counter measure Japanese companies hurt by foreign trade practices can take is to 
make an appeal through an industry association or similar body to the government 
minister in charge.119  
 
4.3  CONCLUSSION 
The idea of stakeholder participation is not novel and is essential for any economy. 
The US and EU have comprehensive systems allowing for the participation of 
stakeholders in the process of initiating trade disputes and this may evidence their 
active participation in DSU. The Australian system may be said to model the 
mechanisms of these countries but with a less formal approach and does not cover as 
wide an area as that of the US and EU. Some developing countries like Brazil also 
have mechanisms in place and these models may be more suitable for other 
developing countries as opposed to adopting elements from the developed models. 
However the models can be analyzed by SSA developing countries with the aim of 
providing ideas on the elements which can be included or covered by the mechanism 
they will put in place. There is no perfect model and these models may not work 
effectively for developing countries. Therefore the applicable elements may be 
included in the proposed mechanism and be adapted to the specific circumstances of 
the country or regional trading bloc, taking into account the difference in the role 
played by stakeholders in the economies and politics of their countries, as well as the 
available resources for such a mechanism. The following chapter will set out the 
recommendations and conclusions. 
                                                 
118According to Shaffer G.C.(200, Supra at 42, Brazil has adapted to the WTO system by creating 
specialized trade bureaucracies, coordinating interagency trade policy processes in home capitals, and 
maintaining specialized trade units in Geneva, and have hired and trained lawyers to specialize in WTO 
law and developed closer relations on trade matters with the private export sector.  
119 Keidanren N., Supra, 2. 
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Chapter Five 
 
5.1.  Recommendations and Conclusion 
  
To deploy WTO law to their advantage Namibia and other developing countries need 
to maintain routine on-going procedures for gathering, processing and prioritizing 
information from foreign embassies, the private sector, university research programs, 
advisory centers (both public and private owned), and international trade consultants 
regarding foreign barriers. The building of this public-private partnership will take 
time but will be most beneficial in the long run.120
 
Namibia and other SACU nations need external cost-effective legal assistance to help 
identify, pursue and defend their WTO rights. They can enlist the services of the 
Advisory Centre121 on WTO law122 in Geneva, which can be assisted by the 
Stakeholders’ participation, tralac123 and the SACU notification mechanism. In-house 
International Trade expertise at these fora can collaborate with the lawyers at the 
Advisory Centre. The contribution to be made by the regional agencies can aid in 
reducing the legal costs of utilizing the services of the Advisory Center, as most 
                                                 
120 Shaffer G.C., (2003) 43. 
121 To date the only SSA country which is a member of the WTO Advisory Center is Kenya, and non of 
the SACU nations are members. The rate charged per hour for legal services rendered by the ACWL is 
charge at a specified rate according to the categorization ranging from A to B. The current category A 
fees are US$100,00 category B US$200,00 and least developing countries are charged US$25,00 per 
hour. www.awl.ch accessed May 28, 2007. 
122 The centre is designed to counsel and represent countries so that they may defend their WTO rights 
at rates that vary depending on the country’s membership status, share of world trade and per capita 
income. 
123 The Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac) is a section 21 (not for profit) company with the 
mission to build trade law capacity in order to facilitate the integration of the Southern African region 
into the global trading system. The Centre was officially launched on 25 November 2002.  
 Tralac has partnered with many international and regional organisations on diverse trade related 
projects. Highlights include:  
• Research and capacity building in the areas of dispute settlement in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) in a joint project with the German Agency for Technical 
Co-operation (GTZ);  
• Trade in agriculture training programmes in Mozambique, Tanzania and SACU;  
• Competition policy training in Namibia;  
• A post-Cancun review presented together with regional partner organisations; and  
• A trade law conference for business which facilitated interaction between business and 
Government (Department of Trade and Industry – the dti) in South Africa.  
 The centre was established to support the governments of Southern Africa by carrying out 
consultancy-type studies, to provide a basis for trade policy formulation. 
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research work, and if possible, the drafting of the briefs can be prepared in 
collaboration with all these agencies. The Center can also be used to develop national 
expertise in WTO dispute settlement through its internship possibilities and periodic 
seminars for developing country officials on the WTO DSS. The centre can assist 
groups of like-minded countries, such as the SACU countries, in preparing third party 
submissions in WTO disputes to defend their systemic interests.124
  
Developing countries could pool their resources through developing regional WTO 
centers that can develop WTO expertise in a more cost-effective manner. In Southern 
Africa, SACU because of the similar trade interests between its members can take the 
leading role in the creation of such a center. The proposed center can assist in 
identifying trade priorities, coordinating trade negotiating strategies, building public 
private workshops; identify trade barriers and (potentially) providing legal support in 
WTO litigation. Tralac should be enhanced so as to assist the advisory Centre in 
WTO litigation. States within regions face diverse challenges and their national 
interests can conflict, so that the development of regional centers also faces 
significant challenges. The Advisory Centre and developing countries could work 
with academics that specialize in WTO law on a consultancy or pro bono basis.125   
 
WTO cases have become more factually and legally complex, the demands for 
complainants and defendants have accumulated and private industry’s role in dispute 
settlement system has correspondingly expanded. Private industry representatives are 
fundamental for the establishment of factual record and the development of legal 
arguments to apply to those facts.126
 
                                                 
124 Shaffer G.C., (2007) 47 and 49.   
125 Mosoti V. (2003) 71-92, Abstract at 25. 
126 Shaffer G.C., Id. In the U.S., for example, private counsel typically provides sample briefs or 
memoranda from which representatives at the USTR can cut and paste, as well as mark-up of the 
USTR’s rafts. The EC banana case, for example, involved over a dozen claims under four WTO 
agreements (GATT (1994), GATS, TRIMS, and the License agreement). The initial panel decision 
alone was over four hundred and seventy pages, much of it setting forth the case’s factual background 
involving a detailed description of the EC’s Byzantine banana quota and licensing regime. The U.S. 
attorneys involve in the bananas case maintain that a mark of the United States’ success is that the 
factual description in the WTO panel report was largely taken from the U.S. brief and much of this 
brief had been prepared by Chiquita and its lawyers. Similarly the EC has attempted to forge better 
direct links with EC private enterprises and trade associations in advancing the EC’s export interests as 
part of the EC’s Market Access Strategy. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/1 (Feb. 12, 1996). 
See also Shaffer, Supra 24-27 
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Most consultations notified to the WTO end up in settlement.127 The primary threat of 
the dispute settlement mechanism is said to lie, not so much in the enforcement of 
final decision as in the risk of a clear public condemnation of the defendants’ policies. 
Reinhardt and Busch (2003) argue that it is “the threat of legal condemnation, rather 
than the ruling per se, that induces settlement.128 There is thus greater incentive to 
settle before the issue become public.129  
 
The shortcomings set out above may be common in many developing countries, 
including Namibia, but the situation is further aggravated by political interference 
during the initiation of a dispute. The problem is not so much the private sector’s 
inability to identify trade distorting measures taken by other WTO members, but the 
ability of the private and public sector to co-operate, without any political pressure 
and let business be business. With this is meant the ability to identify the alleged 
measure for economic growth of the country and not just as a problem that the private 
sector has to deal with because they are the ones directly affected by the measure. In 
addition the parties should not be expecting a phone call from state house telling them 
that they should drop everything as their intended actions are not a National interest. 
One should not make the mistake and assume that these nations lack the necessary 
skills to identify the measures that effect trade in a specific sector, least of all the 
ability to draft the necessary brief setting out the claim, sometimes all these elements 
are present but the independence of the private sector from bureaucratic interference. 
The problem is two-fold in that the government fails to get involved when it has to 
and interferes when it should not.     
 
Adversely affected exporters are less likely to participate when they are involved in a 
preferential trade agreement with the respondent, when they lack the capacity to 
retaliate against the respondent by withdrawing trade concessions, when they are poor 
and small, and when they are particularly reliant on the respondent for bilateral 
                                                 
127 www.wto.org accessed April 14, 2007. 
128 Busch, Mark L. & Reinhardt, Eric (2003) 719-735. 
129 Id. The political and economic pressures that are associated with international disputes direct that in 
order to gain from the multilateral trading system a member’s goal should not be to win cases within 
the dispute settlement system, but to win them in bilateral negotiations before the issue becomes public. 
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assistance. These results suggest evidence of an institutional bias affecting active 
engagement by developing member countries in the current WTO system.130
 
To use the WTO system successfully a member must develop cost-effective 
mechanisms to perceive injuries to its trading prospects, identify who is responsible 
and mobilize resources to bring a legal claim or negotiate a settlement. Participation 
of a member in the system will thus, in part, be a function of its ability to process 
knowledge of trade injuries and their relation to WTO rights.131 The hiring of internal 
lawyers to defend WTO claims is of little use if developing countries lack cost-
effective mechanisms to identify and prioritize claims in the first place. Similarly, 
where developing countries become aware of actionable injuries, their awareness will 
not be transformed into a legal claim if, based on experience, they lack confidence 
that a claim is worth pursuing given high litigation costs and scant remedies. 132 
Developing a less costly, stakeholder inclusive system, which may or may not include 
elements form the formal U.S., and EU systems, and the informal Australian or 
Brazilian systems, will enable developing countries to identify foreign trade barriers, 
prioritize them according to their impact, and mobilize resources for WTO 
complaints. The developing countries have to mobilize resources through interagency 
coordination and networking with their private sector. 
 
In addition to the NTF and the proposed notification mechanism Namibia and SACU 
need to put in place more measures that will enable it to organize unremitting 
relations with the private sector to identify trade barriers and investigate and prioritize 
                                                 
130 C.P. Brown,(2005) 2005. 
131 As earlier explained in this paper, the first step in any WTO dispute is for a country to select a case 
where a trade barrier against its exports potentially violates WTO law. The export industry in that 
country is the best source of information about that trade problem. As can be derived from a reading of 
Chapter   of this paper and the frequent participation in the disputes, the EU and US have both 
institutionalized the process to channel demands from business to government and have extensive 
private sector support for most WTO disputes. Contrary to this practice, developing country business 
communities often lack sufficient information about the WTO to make them consider WTO 
adjudication as a solution to their problems. The industries are less likely to urge their governments to 
take action on specific trade barriers and government does not become aware of the full set of potential 
cases. 
132 Retaliatory measures such as the withdrawal of concessions are effective when it hits the author of 
the WTO-inconsistent measure enough to want to consider the measure. The majority of African 
countries are dependent on continuing trade relationships with the agricultural rest of the world. As 
producers of unprocessed agricultural goods, their exports end up in one or other developed nation and 
they do not have an alternative with which to retaliate. The countries only stand to suffer if they tried to 
retaliate. See, Musoti V. (2003) 86, Abstract at 16. 
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them. The state officials in Namibia and SACU can develop and foster a partnership 
with the private sector through which a reflex mechanism exists when exporters face a 
trade barrier that raises WTO issues. In this way the private sector will assist the 
public officials in investigating the claim and building a factual and legal case. 
Through this Namibia and other SACU members can have better access to the 
information necessary to enforce their rights through the WTO dispute settlement 
system and through settlement in its shadow, and thereby use the WTO system more 
effectively to their advantage. The Ultimate goal is for them to use the WTO dispute 
settlement to challenge barriers to their export and benefit from the agreements they 
have signed. Request technical assistance from international development 
institutions133 to research and report on trade barriers, on a sectoral basis that their 
exporters face; request assistance in organizing a data base or other informational 
system to identify and prioritize trade barriers.134  
 
In order to increase the reliability and stability associated with petitions submitted by 
companies to the government, the government should create procedures that are 
coherent, fair, and transparent. Such a system would prove helpful not only for large 
enterprises but even more for companies without direct contacts with government, 
i.e., small and medium-sized companies and regional companies. Creating procedures 
under which companies are able to call upon the government to initiate an 
investigation would not only help directly affected companies and associations, but 
also contribute to enhancing the welfare of the public in counterpart nations (such as 
the SACU members as earlier discussed, who directly suffer from such unfair trade 
practices, and benefit the entire global economy by promoting free trade and the 
stability of international trade.135  
  
Last but not least, there is a need for the establishment of an adequately staffed WTO 
Mission which will complement the strengthening of the institutional capacity at 
home and will influence the strengthening of stakeholder participation at all levels 
especially that of initiation of trade disputes.  
                                                 
133 Possible international agencies that can render technical assistance are Trade Knowledge Network 
(TKN), International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), International Center for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ITCSD), South Center, and UNCTAD.  
134 Shaffer G.C. (2003) 42-43. 
135 Keidanren N., (2004) 2 
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5.2.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has identified salient features of stakeholder participation which can be 
adapted to the Namibian and SACU environment. This would strengthen the 
stakeholder participation mechanism that is put in place in Namibia and at SACU and 
it will enhance the participation of Namibia and other SACU members in the WTO 
DS process, addressing or preventing trade distorting measures faced by their 
industries and pave the way for contributions by these developing member states 
towards the development of WTO law. The challenges faced by developing countries 
as set out in chapter two may be lessened and it is expected that this mechanism will 
enable them to actively participate in the WTO DSS. 
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National Trade Forum 
(NTF) 
Operational Rules and Procedures 
 
Background 
In July 2005 the Ministry of Trade & Industry submitted a proposal to Cabinet to set up a 
formal consultative and cooperation mechanism (the National Trade Forum) between the 
Ministry of Trade & Industry and the economic stakeholders, especially the private business 
sector.  
This forum, instead of irregular and reactionary consultation, is considered necessary for a 
joint effort towards the realisation of national aspiration and objectives and the positioning of 
Namibia competitively in international trade and investment arenas.  In particular, the private 
sector is encouraged to aggressively utilise the advantages or opportunities presented in the 
various trade and investment agreements executed by the Government. 
Cabinet approved the concept (Cabinet Decision No 17 2August 2005 / 007) and the 
proposed terms of reference of the National Trade Forum and this paper outlines the 
operational rules and procedures to be followed in our pursuit of enhanced economic growth, 
development, employment and financial sustainability of Namibia. 
Separate Memorandum of Understanding were signed with each of the Namibia Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, the Namibia Manufacturers Association and the Indigenous 
Business Council to encourage a spirit of cooperation and to ensure that all lobbying for 
changes to Government Trade Policy and requests for technical and / or financial assistance 
must be channelled through the National Trade Forum.  Similarly, the Government 
undertakes to consult with these organisations on matters of mutual concern. 
 
1. Ordinary Sessions 
1.1 The National Trade Forum, established to strengthen cooperation between 
the Government and the Private Sector on matters related to trade and 
investment, shall meet as a forum a least once every two months for the 
purpose of an ordinary session or by the convening of an extra-ordinary 
session whenever one or more members are of the opinion that it is 
necessary to do so;  
1.1.1 The ordinary and extra-ordinary meetings of the NTF shall be chaired 
by designated officials of the Ministry of Trade & Industry or by the 
Minister or Deputy Minister. 
1.2 The National Trade Forum will establish and monitor the operation and 
progress of the three sub-committees dealing with 
 (i) Market access, for agriculture & non-agricultural goods (see Appendix 
I for the main sectors of the Customs classification), 
 (ii) Trade in Services (see Appendix II for details of the sub-sectors), and 
 (iii) Trade Measurers and Regulations (see Appendix III for details of the 
more relevant Agreements). 
 The specialized sub-committees, specified above shall meet on a monthly 
basis or as required.  Each sub-committee shall be chaired by persons, 
preferable from the private sector, elected by the participating members of the 
respective sub-committee and ratified by the Minister of Trade & Industry. 
1.2.1 Each of the sub-committees shall appoint working groups to examine, 
evaluate and make recommendations on the specific tasks delegated 
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to them by the sub-committee. Participation in these working groups 
shall be restricted to persons of professional standing and experience 
in the field in question.  These working groups may consult and seek 
information and technical advice from any source they deem 
appropriated. 
 
2. Membership 
2.1 Membership of the Forum is composed of representatives of the main 
economic stakeholders in both the private and public sectors. The initial 
membership was determined by the Ministry of Trade & Industry as were the 
firms represented on the sub-committees and is contained in the Terms of 
Reference. 
2.2 Applications for new members of the forum and sub-committees (collectively 
the fora), shall be lodged in writing, addressed to the Permanent Secretary of 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
2.3 Participation in the various meetings of the NTF implies and demands a high 
degree of confidentiality and participants may be required to sign restrictive 
confidentiality agreements with the NTF. 
 
3. Agenda 
3.1 The Agenda for each of the NTF and for each of the sub-committee meetings 
shall be prepared by the NTF Secretariat, in consultation with the 
Chairperson, and shall be forwarded to all members of the respective fora at 
least 14 days prior to the date scheduled for the meeting, unless the fora or 
subcommittee is urgently required to meet to discuss a specific matter. The 
use of electronic mail is permissible for all communication and inadvertent 
failure to give notice to any member will not invalidate the meeting. 
3.1.1 Members are requested to confirm attendance 48 hours prior to the 
scheduled meeting  
3.1.2 Apologies must be made to the NTF prior to the date scheduled for 
the meeting  
3.1.3 The tendered apologies referred to in 3.1.2 above must be recorded 
as part of the minutes 
3.2 Each working group will meet as required by the specific functions / mandates 
assigned to it and establish their respective rules of procedure. 
 
4.  Minutes 
4.1 The Chairperson of the forum shall cause minutes of the meeting to be taken 
in an orderly and concise manner by the NTF secretariat.  
4.2 The minutes must constitute accurate notes of that which transpired during 
the meetings and record the recommendations made or actions to be taken. 
4.3 The minutes shall be kept by the Ministry of Trade & Industry and shall be 
available for inspection by any member upon request to the Chairperson  
4.4 The minutes of all meetings should be made available to all members within 7 
days of the meeting and shall either “be taken as read” or read aloud prior to 
proceedings so as to ensure that all members present agree that the minutes 
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in question constitute a proper and accurate record of the last meeting and 
then signed by the Chairperson.  Failing which the signature of the 
Chairperson of the meeting of the previous meeting will be considered 
evidence of them having being an accurate record of what transpired at that 
meeting. 
 
5.  Meeting Procedures 
5.1 The meeting procedures as stipulated below may be used by any member so 
as to ensure the efficient functioning of the meeting and to assist the 
Chairperson in the aim of achieving this result. 
5.1.1  Agenda 
  The sequence of matters on the agenda may be altered to suit the 
flow of the meeting or the meeting adjourned to allow further research.   
  New items may only be added to the agenda if the item is of national 
importance and cannot be held over until the next regular meeting and 
then any recommendations made must be circulated to all regular 
members of the forum to allow non-attending members to give their 
input to the Ministry of Trade & Industry. 
5.1.2  Point of Order 
  Any member may utilise this procedural point when of the opinion that 
the member / person with the floor is flouting procedural rules or is 
speaking off the topic 
5.1.3  Point of Information 
  Any member may utilise this procedural point when of the opinion that 
they require further information from the member / person with the 
floor or wish to furnish further information on the point in question. 
5.1.4  Out of Order 
  The Chairperson may utilise this procedural point when of the opinion 
that the member / person with the floor is being repetitive, rude, 
frivolous, or vexatious or behaving him / herself in an unsatisfactory or 
disorderly fashion. 
5.2 Each session / meeting may commence with an opening plenary, followed by 
breakaway sessions by the sub-committees of the Forum and may be 
concluded by a closing plenary. 
 
6.  Quorum 
6.1 For ordinary or extra-ordinary sessions for which the stipulated notice period 
has been given the quorum shall be the members present, provided that at 
least three members of the public sector and three Government appointed 
representatives must be present through out the meeting. 
.  For any subcommittee meeting at least three members of the public sector 
and three Government appointed representatives must be present through 
out the meeting before any recommendation can be made to the Minister. 
 
 7.  Decisions and / or recommendations of the Forum. 
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7.1 All decisions and / or recommendations shall be reached by way of  
7.1.1  consensus, or 
7.1.2  by a simple majority on a vote 
7.1.2.1   the forum may elect to vote:  
   (i) by show of hands ; or 
   (ii) by secret ballot . 
7.1.2.2  Where the forum elects to take a decision by way of voting by 
show of hands, the Chairperson shall call for a show of hands 
by calling on members present to raise their hands either in 
support of a motion or to illustrate their disagreement with a 
motion. 
7.1.2.3  Where the forum elects to take a decision by way of secret 
ballot, the Chairperson shall:  
  (i) ensure that all present members are provided with a 
ballot on which to indicate agreement or disagreement 
with a proposed motion; 
  (ii) ensure that all the ballots are collected and counted in 
the presence of 3 members who will tally the votes and 
notify the Chairperson of the outcome; and 
  (iii) ensure that the forum is informed of the outcome of the 
secret ballot. 
7.2 Decisions taken by the members shall not be binding on the Ministry of 
Trade & Industry or the Government of the Republic of Namibia but shall 
convey the recommendations of the Public Sector to the Government.  
 
8.  The Fora’s Powers 
 The respective Fora (the NTF and / or its sub-committees) shall have the 
power to:   
- to co-opt additional members to participate in the forum 
- to admit or refuse applicants for membership 
- to establish further sub committees or working groups 
- to nominate members to serve on committees or to represent Namibia 
in any related trade negotiations 
- to vote on recommendations / decisions 
- to nominate any representative member to address the Forum on 
matters of importance 
- to attend the ordinary and extra-ordinary sessions 
- to participate in any activity giving rise to the fulfilment of the NTF’s 
objectives 
- to brief their constituencies after each meeting and to provide 
feedback during the following meeting 
 
9. The Secretariat, Budget & Contributions 
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9.1 The Ministry of Trade & Industry will provide the necessary staffing for the 
NTF’s Secretariat and shall prepare and present the annual budget estimate 
and financial statements of the National Trade Forum to the plenary session 
in February each year for approval and submission to the Minister of Trade & 
Industry. 
9.1.1 It is envisaged that the Ministry of Trade & Industry will include the 
cost of the Secretariat, including the cost of the preparation and 
printing of agenda papers, reports and approved publications, 
provision of venues for meetings and refreshments. 
9.1.2 The Ministry of Trade & Industry, either through its own budget or 
other donor funding will cover the travel and subsistence cost of 
official delegations to trade forum meetings with foreign governments 
or similar bodies, including the Export Promotion Agency, when 
established, where Namibia may benefit and not a single specific 
entity. 
9.1.3 Where Namibia is to be represented at trade fairs, exhibitions and 
other private initiatives for product promotion and development, etc, 
the cost of travel & subsistence may be apportioned among all 
participants, on a specific pre-agreed basis in the spirit of a Public 
Private Partnership. The Ministry of Trade & Industry will endeavour to 
negotiate favourable tax incentives for participants 
9.1. The budgeted time costs and out of pocket disbursements incurred in 
the preparation of reports for submission to Government or other 
approved bodies or the briefing of these will be deemed a cost of the 
NTF and be reimbursed on presentation of an itemised statement of 
account. 
9.2 It is not envisaged that the attendance of regular plenary, sub-committee or 
working group meetings will be remunerated, unless agreed to by the Minister 
of Trade & Industry. 
 
10.  Dissolution. 
10.1 The Forum shall be dissolved by 
10.1.1  a resolution passed during an ordinary session at which two-thirds of 
the members present are in favour of the resolution for which due 
notice has been given. 
 
10.1.2 a decision to that effect, taken by the Minister of Trade and Industry, 
subject to article 18 of the Namibian Constitution. 
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